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Introduction
In the United States, midterms go poorly for the party controlling the White House. In the
volatile and ever-changing world of politics, this tendency has been described as an “inevitability
rivaling death and taxes.”1 This phenomenon is known as “the midterm effect” or “midterm
decline”. From the late 1860s onwards, this effect has resulted in about 30 House of
Representative seats lost on average, by the president’s party, in each election cycle. Since the
Civil War, the president’s party has gained seats and improved their vote share only once during
a midterm. In the unpredictable nature of politics, this consistency is exceptional.
Despite consensus on the phenomenon’s existence, the causes of midterm decline have
long been a black box in political science, with different models of midterm decline competing
and combining to explain the historical disadvantage of the president’s party at midterms. These
explanations largely fall under three categories: the mean reversion and surge and decline model,
the referendum model, and the presidential penalty model. Mean reversion and surge and decline
suggest that midterms aren’t particularly bad for the president’s party, but rather an inevitable
regression from the abnormally high performance of the president’s party in the joint
presidential-congressional election. Referendum models state midterm decline depends on the
president’s approval rating and handling of the economy. Presidential penalty models suggest
midterms inherently disadvantage the president’s party. During a midterm, presidential
opposition is more likely to turn out to vote and moderate voters are inclined to vote against the
president’s party to create ideological balance. These two facets of midterms penalize the party
regardless of surge and decline and the president’s handling of government. Together, these three
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models of midterm decline describe both the tendency for the president’s party to lose seats
during a midterm and explain the variance in midterm success for the president’s party.
Though midterm decline is extensively studied in the United States, there has been
limited research in other countries on the connection between presidential elections and nonconcurrent federal legislative elections.2 Instead, midterm related research abroad typically
considers the relationship between parliamentary control and second-order elections, such as
local elections or elections to other legislative bodies. This research can demonstrate that the
midterm effect may go beyond the United States but fails to show a clear connection between
presidential control and non-concurrent legislative elections. However, analyzing how
presidential parties fare during midterms outside of the United States could provide insights that
can’t be captured by focusing on the U.S. alone or by focusing on parliamentary and secondorder elections. Analyzing the midterm effect in countries with similar institutions can show
whether midterm decline is exclusive to the United States. Even if midterm decline occurs in
other countries, the causes may be different. For instance, while the health of the economy could
dictate the extent of midterm decline in one country, other countries could be particularly
affected by surge and decline. By looking beyond the United States, variances in institutions can
highlight the extent to which midterm decline in the United States relies on those institutions.
Some countries have electoral schedules that prevent any legislative elections from occurring
concurrently with presidential elections. This eliminates the possibility of a surge and decline
scenario because midterm elections wouldn’t follow a joint congressional-presidential election.
Therefore, if the country doesn’t experience midterm decline, it may suggest that midterm
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decline is particularly reliant on surge and decline. Knowing how midterms affect other countries
can help uncover the intricacies of the United States midterm effect.
Although the existence of midterm decline has been documented extensively in the
United States, I will test the extent to which presidential parties are punished for controlling the
presidency in El Salvador and Argentina. I choose these countries for their institutional
similarities to the United States, which should provide a similar foundation for midterm decline.
El Salvador and Argentina have presidential systems without a prime minister, a history of
democracy, and legislative elections that occur non-concurrently with presidential elections.
Beyond analyzing the existence of midterm decline, I use approval ratings, the health of the
economy, previous presidential success, and previous seat control to explain the variance in
midterm outcomes for the president’s party. I choose these explanatory variables for their fit into
three commonly cited models of midterm decline: mean reversion and surge and decline,
referendum, and presidential penalty models. I test the extent to which the countries have an
observable midterm effect and unveil whether the causes fit into any of these three models.
In the next chapter, I focus on midterm decline and similar phenomenon in other
countries, considering how competing explanations for midterm decline can explain the tendency
for political parties wielding political power to lose seats in second-order elections. Chapter two
focuses on the methodology of determining comparison countries, and details how I will answer
whether a country has midterm decline and why it happens. This chapter also outlines the
sources of data and the models I use for analysis. Chapters three through five focus on the United
States, Argentina, and El Salvador, respectively. In each of these chapters I consider the
country’s democratic history, political parties, and governmental and electoral institutions. I
analyze the extent of the country’s midterm effect, and what determines the variance in its
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strength. With each of the countries I consider the extent to which three models of midterm
decline (surge and decline and mean reversion, presidential penalty, and referendum model) can
explain the existence and variance of midterm decline. My final chapter discusses how the
various midterm models show themselves in the three countries and why the strength of the
midterm effect varies by country.
1. Theory
Academic research on the midterm effect has mostly focused on the United States.
America’s electoral schedule, long history of elections, and straightforward party system makes
it a prime candidate for measurement. Although the connection between parliamentary control
and second-order elections has been researched, my focus on presidential systems suggests I
should use American midterm theory as the beginning point. The midterm effect in the United
States is especially consistent. From the end of the Civil War to 1998, there had been only one
election in which the party controlling the White House gained seats in a midterm election. Since
then, there’s been two more exceptions to this trend, and while it’s possible the midterm effect
doesn’t carry the weight it used to, presidential parties still face long odds.3 The research on the
midterm effect in the U.S. and the explanatory theories for its existence shed light on analytical
approaches for understanding midterms abroad. Before exploring a possible midterm effect in
other countries, we must first understand how it works in the United States.
1.1 The Scale of Midterm Decline
Midterms in the United States go poorly for the party controlling the White House. While
the midterm effect can be seen in the Senate and even State Legislatures, the bulk of study on the
midterm effect has measured seat changes in the House of Representatives. This House of
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Representatives bias is due to the larger sample size of seats, and that the entire chamber is up
for election every two years. In the past twenty-seven elections since the House of
Representatives was expanded to its current 435 seats, the party controlling the White House has
lost an average of over 30 seats during midterm elections.4 Since 1866, there’s only been three
instances in which the president’s party has gained seats during a midterm, 1934, 1998, and
2002. All of those gains were less than ten seats, and some accompanied vote losses.5 Although
seats have often been the heuristic for measuring midterm decline, vote changes show a similar
bias against the president’s party. Given that gerrymandering and a changing swing ratio have
impacted the relation between votes and seats, vote change can provide a more accurate,
consistent heuristic. Even exceptions to midterm decline and their circumstances conform to the
narrative of midterm decline. In 2002, for instance, the Republican’s seat gain can be attributed
to the Bush’s popularity after the 9/11 attacks, and the relatively poor Republican performance
during the 2000 elections.6 The 1934 gain in seats for the Democratic party is often attributed to
the New Deal realignment, while the strong economy and rallying around the flag after Clinton’s
impeachment are often cited to explain the 1998 election.7 Even with these three exceptions,
elections reliably conform to the pull of the midterm effect.
Something akin to a midterm effect seems to extend beyond the United States’ borders.
Kern, Holger and Hainmueller suggest that parties controlling the upper and lower house of
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Germany’s legislature tend to lose seats in local elections.8 This results in local elections that
tend to swing in the opposite direction of the control of Germany’s national legislature, creating
a balance between parties. This same partisan divide between national legislative power and
control over regional districts can be seen in Canada.9 Something akin to a midterm effect even
appears to influence European parliamentary elections. Reif and Schmitt note national opposition
parties tend to be more successful in European Parliamentary elections.10 These examples
support the idea that party control of the national government can hurt the party in second-order
elections. Although research on presidential systems is limited, Shugart finds similar trends when
considering divided government in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and France. Shugart notes
that divided government is especially common in nonconcurrent elections, elections where the
legislature is up for election, but the president is not.11 This conforms to the narrative that
presidential parties are penalized when the president isn’t on the ballot.
The United States midterm experience demonstrates that parties controlling the White
House underperform in midterm elections. Likewise, in countries beyond the United States,
electoral tendencies parallel the outcomes of the midterm effect in the United States. While the
midterm effect may not have the same inevitability as death and taxes, its existence is rarely
questioned. However, though the existence of midterm effect may be agreed upon in the United
States, there remains debate over the causes of the midterm effect. One of the suggested causes is
the statistical tendency known as mean reversion.
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1.2 Mean Reversion
Surge and decline and mean reversion suggest midterms aren’t inherently as special as
the presidential elections that precede them. These hypotheses suggest that seat loss is merely a
realignment after the exceptional nature of the presidential race. Rather than arguing that
midterms are inherently bad for the president’s party, they merely appear bad when compared to
the preceding legislative election that coincided with the presidential race.
The simpler of these explanations is mean reversion. This states that midterm decline
isn’t a political phenomenon so much as a statistical one.12 Mean reversion occurs when a
variable occurrence, in this case the seats won by a particular party, is far away from the mean,
and will subsequently tend to move towards the mean. For instance, if one were to have a
particularly good round of golf, she’d be likely to do worse the next round and revert back to the
mean, not because she’s getting worse at golf, but because the previous success was related to
luck or short-term effects.
This phenomenon happens with midterm elections because of the correlation between
presidential success and congressional success for a party. A presidential win usually is
correlated with legislative wins for the president’s party.13 The congressional success that results
from the presidential election is referred to as “presidential coattails”.14 After the election, the
party controls a higher share of seats than normal and is therefore removed from the mean. This
removal means the subsequent election will likely see a decrease in seats. While it’s possible for
a party to improve on their presidential race performance, there’s more room to lose seats than to
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gain seats. This suggests midterm elections aren’t particularly bad for the president’s party, they
just appear like a loss in comparison to the preceding success of the presidential race.
This explanation would also indicate that the better the president’s party does during the
presidential election, the farther away from the mean they are, and the more room they have to
regress backwards. Alternatively, this suggests that the president’s party is more likely to gain
seats during midterms when the presidential coattails are small. Although the impact of 9/11
can’t be underestimated, mean reversion could help explain the 2002 midterms. In 2000, Bush
lost the popular vote and his party lost house seats, barely holding on to the majority.15 Because
his Republican party didn’t perform substantially better than average, there was as much room in
2002 for the party to improve on their 2000 performance as worsen. At its most basic level, mean
reversion suggests that the typically high performance of the president’s party during a
concurrent election is hard to improve upon.
1.3 Surge and Decline
The surge and decline model parallels the principles of mean reversion, but takes them a
step further. While mean reversion happens regardless of differences between midterms and
presidential races, surge and decline notes how differences in the composition of the electorate
creates a midterm decline. Presidential races are “high stimulus” environments with high
presidential excitement that inevitably carries other House and Senate candidates to victory.16
Many of the voters who would otherwise not vote, turn out for the president’s party. Campbell
estimates that “a party's typical House candidate gains four to six votes on his or her opponent
from every 10 votes brought to the polls to vote for the party's presidential candidate.”17 But this
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presidential surge is temporary. During midterms, short term excitement diminishes, and without
the down-ballot effects of the presidential race, the electorate votes to return control back to the
mean. This difference in “presidential enthusiasm” is reflected in the turnout. Presidential races
tend to have significantly higher turnout than their midterm counterparts, meaning many of those
who showed up to the ballot to vote for a presidential candidate decided to stay home during the
midterm. Erikson argues this decreased turnout means the core partisans that vote for their party
in the same way each election determine midterm outcomes.18 Angus Campbell, who initially
proposed the idea of surge and decline, suggests the low stimulus nature of midterms mean the
results won’t deviate much from an even split between Republicans and Democrats.19 Recent
research has shown that midterm election results tend to have higher variance than their
presidential election counterparts, dispelling the notion that midterms represent a return to a low
variance “baseline”.20 Still, midterms are fundamentally different elections from presidential
ones and the party of the president continues to benefit from presidential coattails.
The surge and decline model is a stronger claim than mean reversion. While mean
reversion only suggests that strong party performance in a presidential race will leave more room
to lose support than gain support, surge and decline explicitly states that the nature of midterms
limit any deviation from the mean. Mean reversion suggests that high electoral performance is
statistically unlikely to be improved upon, whereas the surge and decline model suggests
structural differences between midterms and presidential races induce midterm decline. As with
mean reversion, instances where a president’s party could gain seats during a midterm would
rely on a relatively weak performance in the previous presidential race.
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The exposure hypothesis also helps to strengthen the mean reversion and surge and
decline models. Exposure is the surplus of seats a party holds in comparison to its long-term
average; alternatively, it’s a measure of how removed from the mean a performance is.21
Controlling more seats above the “norm” means a party is more exposed. While it’s intuitive that
higher exposure would lead to a seat decrease in subsequent elections for the same reasons as
mean reversion, differences in the partisan alignment of seats make this reversion stronger.
When a party is more exposed, more of their controlled seats are marginal or unsafe, and are
harder to protect in a subsequent election.22 On the other side, the seats the opponents hold will
be their safest and most reliable seats, making seat gains difficult.23 If all seats were equally easy
to win, it would be much easier for exposed parties to gain seats, and therefore easy for the party
controlling the White House to improve during midterms. However, as parties are more exposed,
they must defend more unsafe seats while trying to win even more difficult seats than the ones
they have. This exacerbates the difficulty of improving on an already good performance.
1.4 Referendum Model
While the surge and decline and mean reversion models go a long way to describe why
the president’s party tends to lose seats during midterms, the referendum model can describe the
variance in this loss. While the president isn’t on the ballot in midterm elections, midterms offer
an opportunity to react to the current administration.24 Tufte argues, “Since the electorate cannot
change administrations at midterm elections, it can only express its approval or disapproval by
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returning or withdrawing legislative majorities.”25 Midterms serve as an opportunity for voters to
react to the president.
Therefore, one would assume the better a president’s performance, the better their party
will perform in the midterm election. Tufte argues the extent of midterm decline is determined
by the president’s approval rating and economic conditions.26 The lower a president’s approval
rating, the worse the president’s party will do during the midterm election.27 This is not a
surprise. If a voter doesn’t approve of the president, they are less likely to approve of his party.
Presidents serve as representatives of their parties, and parties can’t fully escape the connection
to the president’s image. This explanation also makes sense when considering elections that
strayed from the rule of midterm decline. In 1998 and 2002, Clinton and Bush had high approval
ratings, and both of their parties defied the pattern of midterm decline and gained a few seats.
The tie between midterm success and approval ratings also describes why midterms generally
hurt the president’s party. Brace and Hinckley show that while the decline isn’t linear,
presidential approval tends to decrease throughout a president’s term, and tends to be lowest
around midterm elections.28 So, while the tie between presidential approval and midterm success
isn’t inherently worrying for the president’s party, presidential approval tends to be low during
midterms, leading to poor performance of the president’s party.
Tufte argues the second indicator of presidential success and determinant of midterm
decline is the economy. This is intuitive. The successes and failures of the economy are often
ascribed to the government. Because the president serves as head of government as well as the
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figurative leader of her party, the health of the economy is a reflection on the president’s party.
While it is clear the economy matters, it is less clear what economic indicators should be used.29
Tufte points to pre-election changes in real disposable income, adjusted for inflation.30 Because
voters don’t always know the health of the economy, they use the most accessible possible
indicators. Therefore, one’s view of economy is strongly biased towards their own economic
health, which in this case is measured by disposable income. Erikson echoes these thoughts and
uses a similar indicator to measure income changes in the year preceding a midterm.31 Erikson
argues that income changes matter more than even approval ratings, demonstrating that a one
percent annual increase in income will lead to almost a three percent increase in the vote
percentage won by the incumbent president’s party.32 If midterm elections are a referendum on
president, the economy is a common heuristic of the president’s effectiveness. Change in
disposable income, a personal and readily available measure of the economy, can determine
someone’s support for the president, and therefore their support for the president’s party.
The referendum model takes shape beyond the United States. Reiff and Schmitt argue
disappointments with specific policies, and a desire to apply pressure to the government tends to
advantage opposition parties in elections to the European Union.33 They also note that the
strength of this anti-governing party bias is proportional to the amount of time since the most
recent national election.34 This parallels the notion that approval declines throughout a
president’s term, and the later a second-order election is, the lower the approval rating of the
government and the worse the governing party’s performance in an election. This finding is
29
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supported by Jeffery and Hough, who show that approval of the governing party in Germany
tends to decrease steadily after an initial honeymoon period, often to a low point during secondorder elections, which leads to negative voting against the party in local elections.35 Even
Shugart’s research on presidential systems and divided government shows that divided
government occurs more frequently later in a president’s term, falling in line with conceptions of
the referendum model.36 Although the referendum model is most frequently applied to the United
States, it’s likely the same mechanisms impact governing parties abroad.
1.5 Presidential Penalty Model
Erikson suggests that these models don’t do enough to describe why the president’s party
does poorly in midterm elections. The referendum model describes the variance in midterm
electoral success and mean reversion and surge and decline shows midterms go poorly when
compared to the previous high stimulus presidential election. Previous literature does less to
show that the nature of midterms is inherently bad for a presidential party. Scholars tend to
suggest that midterms are a drop from the abnormally high vote of a presidential election, rather
than an abnormally low vote because of the midterm itself.37 Erikson challenges this notion,
suggesting that presidential parties are inherently penalized during midterms with what he
describes as the presidential penalty model. Erikson suggests there is a punitive response of the
electorate towards the president that goes beyond the referendum model.38 Determining that the
electorate is predisposed to vote against the president could help explain midterm decline
without viewing it as simply a relative drop from a previous high. This would explain why even
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presidents with relatively high approval ratings and limited surge tend to perform poorly in
midterms.
The first possibility Erikson considers is a propensity towards negative voting. Erikson
states potential voters with negative views of the president are more likely to vote than potential
voters with positive views.39 This means turnout for the president’s supporters would be
depressed in comparison to his detractors. Voters also respond more to negative cues than to
positive ones when considering who to vote for.40 Undecided voters are also more likely to
respond to criticism than praise of the president, and are more likely to penalize the president’s
party in the absence of an opposition candidate.41 The president becomes a lightning rod for
criticism, which turns out his detractors to vote, and might push on-the-fence voters to vote
against her. In this model, it is the critics who turnout to vote, and therefore the critics who
decide the referendum. The surge and decline model suggests the presidential party lacks
presidential enthusiasm in midterms, but Erikson’s model suggests voters are inherently
predisposed to vote against the presidency.
Erikson states a presidential penalty could also result from rational calculation and
electoral balancing.42 Voters in the middle of the ideological spectrum might look to moderate
the government and create split partisan control of the presidency and congress to ensure
ideological balance.43 Therefore, even though they may not be against the president, they might
vote against his party to induce balance of power. Erikson states this is common in foreign
countries where local elections will often swing in the opposite direction of the party in control
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of the legislature.44 Although the reasons are different, this rational calculation would result in a
punitive effect on the president’s party.
The presidential penalty model does a good job of explaining why midterms are
inherently bad for the president’s party. Although an inherent presidential penalty is difficult to
measure, Erikson demonstrates that concurrent and nonconcurrent electoral results since 1902
match his presidential penalty model.45 Rather than dismissing the midterm effect as a mere
regression to the mean in comparison to the particularly special presidential election, or detailing
how the president’s performance impacts her party, the presidential penalty helps to understand
why the president’s party could be punished across the board.
Electoral surprise provides another explanation for the tendency of presidential parties to
perform poorly in midterm elections. Although distinct from Erikson’s presidential penalty
model, the electoral surprise model relies on the idea that some voters desire balanced
government, an aspect of Erikson’s model. The electoral surprise model considers a set of
moderate voters that desire divided government.46 Having a presidency and legislature that is
controlled by separate parties ensures that policies are a compromise of ideology rather than the
wishes of one extreme.47 Voters have two opportunities to create divided government: concurrent
presidential and legislative elections as well as midterm elections. In concurrent elections,
moderates vote to create balance based on their guesses of who will win the presidential race.48
Therefore, they will vote for the opposite party that they think will win the presidential election.
During midterms, voters already know who the president is, so it becomes easier to vote to create
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balanced government.49 If voters during concurrent, presidential elections knew who would win
the presidency, then their vote wouldn’t change from presidential election to midterm. However,
because their congressional vote may have been based on an incorrect guess of the presidential
winner, they have the opportunity to change their vote during the midterm.50 This means that the
more surprising an election is, the more voters will have voted based on incorrect assumptions,
and the more will switch their votes during midterms.51 Therefore, if the result of a presidential
election is more surprising, the presidential party can expect to lose more seats in the ensuing
midterm.
Despite the importance of the electoral surprise model, electoral surprise is difficult to
measure. One tempting proxy for electoral surprise would be the success of the president in the
most recent election. Higher election performance is correlated with less surprising elections, but
presidential performance still serves as a crude proxy for the actual electoral surprise of an
election. For instance, imagine a scenario where a heavily favored candidate underperforms and
barely ekes out a win. This would imply the race was very surprising, even though most voters
chose their representative based on a correct assumption of who would win. Presidential
performance doesn’t work as a great stand-in for electoral surprise. Even if presidential vote
perfectly measured electoral surprise, presidential performance influences midterms in other
ways that cloud analysis. For instance, higher presidential performance my imply legislative
candidates won on the back of presidential excitement, rather than their own merit. This may
signal larger midterm decline in the future. Also, El Salvador doesn’t have concurrent elections,
meaning legislative election voters are fully aware of the party that controls the presidency.
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The difficulty of measuring electoral surprise suggests that a more thorough
methodological approach is. Scheve’s and Tomz’s research used American National Election
Survey (ANES) data to measure how surprised voters were with the candidate, and how
moderate those voters were.52 From there they could see how the partisanship and surprise from
the presidential election translated to midterm vote preferences. However, there isn’t a
comparable election survey that would allow for measurement of potential electoral surprise
effects in El Salvador and Argentina. Because of the inability to adequately measure the extent of
electoral surprise, I won’t pursue understanding of the role of electoral surprise in this essay.
Erikson’s presidential penalty model is reinforced by evidence from elections abroad.
Kern, Holger and Hainmueller suggest that a desire for ideological balance in government causes
governing parties to perform poorly in second-order elections.53 The phenomenon of the public
using elections to achieve ideological balance is paralleled in Canada, where individual desires
for political balance tend to tilt local election outcomes in the opposite direction of national
legislative control.54 Reiff and Schmitt’s research supports Erikson’s claim that opposition voters
are more likely to turnout by showing that in elections to the European Parliament, mobilization
of opposition support is particularly high.55 Erikson mainly referred to the United States in his
presidential penalty model of midterms. However, even outside the United States, voters use the
ballot box to create balanced government and are more likely to vote when opposed to the
government.
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1.6 An Update: Recent Midterm Literature
While most of the prevailing theories on midterm decline are confined to the late 20th
century, midterm elections have continued as U.S. politics have changed. However, despite the
changes in congressional politics over the past few decades, the explanations for midterm decline
still tend to fall into the broad categories posited by Campbell, Tufte, Erikson, and Howard and
Rosenthal. Yet, even if the causes of the midterm effect may have persisted, the weight of these
factors, and the scale of midterm decline may be changing. As politics in the United States
become more nationalized, and partisan sorting increases, the potential for seat loss for the
president’s party may be changing.
Much of the recent research on the midterm effect has been post-midterm analysis,
particularly after 1998 and 2002. In both midterms, the party controlling the presidency gained
seats in the House of Representatives, countering the typical trend of House seat losses.
Although these elections may seem contradictory to previous research on midterm decline, much
of the post-election analysis focused on how they fit into existing explanations of midterm
decline. In 1998, the strong economy and the backlash to the Clinton impeachment proceedings
led to higher presidential approval.56 Therefore, although the election outcome contradicted the
trend of midterm decline, the referendum model helped explain the anomalous nature. The
Republican house gains in 2002 also made midterm decline seem less inevitable. However,
Campbell suggested that despite the outcome, the 2002 election was typical. Bush’s 63%
approval rating, resulting from 9/11, suggests that the Republican House gains can be partially
attributed to the referendum model. Surge and decline can also help explain the Republican
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House gains in 2002. In 2000, Bush lost the popular vote, which limited the presidential surge
that could’ve brought fellow Republicans to office and made it easier for the Republicans to
improve their House standing in the 2002 midterms.
Elections since 1998 and 2002 have conformed to the tendency of midterm decline and
have largely been attributed to the midterm factors outlined in the late 20th century. After two
years of midterm gains by the president’s party, 2006 returned to the trend of midterm decline.
Jacobson suggests Republican losses can be attributed to the referendum model, with Bush’s low
approval ratings punishing his fellow Republicans.57 Four years later, the Democrats suffered at
the hands of midterm decline, with Obama’s low approval inciting a Republican wave.58 Surge
and decline also explains the extent of midterm decline in 2010. Campbell states that the
Democratic waves of 2006 and 2008 allowed for Democrats to shore up Democratically held
seats in vulnerable districts, allowing for the possibility of a strong reversion to the mean in the
Republican’s favor.59 2014 followed the same trend. Voters punished congressional Democrats
for Obama’s relatively low standing, and the 2012 Democratic gains allowed for a greater
possibility of mean reversion.
Other midterm research in the past twenty years has focused on a greater understanding
of midterms, largely under the framework of the midterm theories posited in the late 20th century.
In 2012, Folke and Snyder show state legislative elections swing in the opposite direction of the
governnor’s party.60 They show the state’s economic conditions and voters’ desire for
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ideological balance explains the variance in this midterm. 61 Erikson, who initially wrote a theory
on the role of presidential penalty, used generic congressional ballot polls to see how a
presidential party’s fortunes change throughout the campaign. Polls early on in the campaign
show a vote seemingly absent of midterm decline, but as the campaign progresses, the
presidential party’s support declines, even without declines in the economy or the president’s
approval rating.62 Erikson suggests this campaign decline shows an inherent presidential penalty
where voters are seeking to balance the presidential party to achieve policy moderation.63 In a
further study, Erikson used an updated set of elections since his initial paper to show the dual
role of surge and decline and electoral balancing. Erikson demonstrates that midterm decline is
less prominent when a presidential election is a landslide and the presidential winner is highly
predictable (if surge and decline effects are controlled for).64 This would parallel Howard and
Rosenthal’s theories that uncertain presidential election voters change their votes during
midterms and create midterm decline.65 On the whole, Erikson casts doubt on the referendum
model, instead arguing surge and decline and presidential penalty play a larger role. Rudalevige
uses more expansive state-level data to measure the relationship between real disposable per
capita income and the share of the two-party vote cast for the incumbent’s party.66 He finds
national-level changes in income positively linked with state-level congressional voting, but no
connection between state-level income changes and state-level congressional voting.67 While
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midterm research certainly extends beyond the theories posited by Tufte, Campbell, Erikson, and
Howard and Rosenthal, analysis often fits in the framework of their models of midterm decline.
Other research has focused on a changing midterm effect, secondary to incumbency, a
nationalized party environment, and the decline of congressional competitivity. The first
prominent analysis of potential change in midterm decline occurred after the 1998 and 2002
midterms. Campbell notes that the role of declining congressional competition has been
underrated in midterms.68 As large seat changes become less common, the scale of the midterm
effect will diminish and presidential parties won’t lose as many seats as they used to.69 As
midterm decline swings fewer seats than in the past, it’s easier for local factors like campaigns
and spending to outweigh the nationalized midterm decline.70 Lex Renda corroborates these
findings, showing that midterm decline has diminished over the past century, and that a declining
number of competitive districts means anti-presidential swings in votes translate into less seats.71
Renda also points to incumbency (as did Campbell), showing that as more members of congress
seek reelection, and reelection becomes a safer bet of retaining office, seats won during a
presidential election are more likely to be held at the midterm.72
However, even since 2002, midterm elections have changed. Jacobson, after 2014, noted
that politics has recently become more nationalized, limiting the role of incumbency and the
local factors that Campbell mentioned in his post 2002 analysis.73 Party’s that control an
unpopular White House will be less able to escape the shadow of the president by campaigning
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on local factors. This may imply a greater midterm effect when the president is unpopular. While
the strength of midterm decline may have diminished over the past few decades, the elections
since 2002 have seen unpopular presidents face significant seat loss. On the other hand, Jacobson
notes that partisan sorting and an increase in straight-ticket voting has even further separated the
parties’ electoral bases.74 These effects create fewer competitive districts and fewer potential
seats to swing in a midterm election. While its possible nationalized politics means the
president’s party faces longer odds in votes, continued partisan sorting might spell diminished
seat losses for the president’s party. The changing political atmosphere may be creating an
environment where large seat swings are less common, but more impacted by national factors,
such as a voter’s referendum on the president.
The changing political environment hasn’t eliminated the fundamental causes of midterm
decline. Presidential parties with low public approval and unimpressive economies still face
longer odds, smaller presidential coattails lead to less sizeable midterm loss, and presidents still
tend to lose seats during midterms. However, as partisan sorting becomes more pervasive and the
number of competitive districts declines, vote swings may translate into less seat change.
Changing congressional politics spell an altered, but fundamentally comparable midterm decline.
2. Methodology
Scholarship on midterm decline in the United States and abroad informs my strategy for
determining what countries to use for comparison and how midterm decline is measured. For
instance, the referendum model states that people react to the president by supporting or
punishing her party during a midterm. Therefore, for midterm decline to take place, the president
must wield legitimate power so that the government’s successes are connected to the president.
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The president must also be seen as a leader within her party so that voting against her party is a
reaction to the president himself. So, comparison countries must have presidents that hold
executive power and serve as figureheads of their party. Previous research also informs how I
measure midterm decline. Most studies on midterm decline focus on how legislative elections are
affected by control of the presidency. If a midterm effect exists in other countries, we’d expect to
see an underperformance by the president’s party in nonconcurrent legislative elections. We’d
also expect the extent of midterm decline to be dictated by the factors outlined by Campbell,
Erikson, and Tufte.
2.1 Basis for Choosing Countries
In selecting comparable countries, I focus on three metrics: electoral system and
schedule, the role of the president, and whether the country has free, fair, and contested elections.
Although I want these to resemble the United States as closely as possible, no country has an
identical electoral system, executive branch, and democracy. Variance is inevitable, but as the
institutions of a country stray farther from those in the United States, the chance of inclusion
decreases.
2.1.1

Electoral Systems and Schedules

In the United States, the president serves four-year terms, with federal elections occurring
at the same time as the presidential elections as well as two years into each presidential term.
Although it would be ideal to have all comparison countries share the electoral system and cycle,
no other country shares identical institutions. Broadly, national legislative elections must occur
in between each presidential election. Ideally, countries will also have elections that cooccur
with the presidential elections, but this is often not the case.

24 Gans
In systems where legislative elections are not tied to the presidency, electoral schedules
depend on differences between the term length of the president and the legislative bodies, as well
as whether the president can call for an election. On the simplest side, countries with presidential
and legislator terms of the same length means the timing of a midterm election occurs at the
same point in a president’s term every legislative cycle. However, when the term lengths differ,
or when a president can disassemble the legislature and call for a legislative election, midterms
will occur at inconsistent points in a president’s tenure, and occasionally would even occur
during a presidential election. This adds another variable that could complicate the consistency
of the midterm effect. However, having midterm elections at different points in the president’s
term allows for further analysis. This variation in timing may impact the midterm effect and
should be considered. Furthermore, inconsistently staggered elections create a scenario where
one legislative election occurs during the presidential race, and another occurs during the
president’s term. This allows an intra-country comparison of surge and decline.
For a country to be considered, it needs midterms occurring in every presidential term.
Although ideally one would occur during the presidential election and another would occur
during the president’s tenure, this is a rarity. Countries that mostly have off-year federal elections
will not be disqualified, but the variance in timelines, especially when presidential and legislative
elections occur at the same time, must be considered and controlled for.
2.1.2

The Role of the President

The midterm effect relies on the assumption that the public perceives the president as one
who wields power and plays an important role in the government. Therefore, it is important to
choose presidents that control the lion’s share of executive power. As a president’s power
diminishes, or even their perception of power diminishes, the public is less likely to view her
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party as being the one in control, especially if a different party controls other branches of
government. Therefore, in selecting comparable countries, I favor countries without a prime
minister. In these countries, the president is seen as both the legitimate head of the government,
as well as a prominent figurehead. This also avoids cases in which the prime minister is of a
differing party, and the visible control of the government is shared by both parties. A similar
situation could arise if the party controlling the legislature is different from that of the president,
but I control for the partisan makeup of the legislative branch in my model.
2.1.3

Free and Fair Elections

The third consideration is the extent to which elections have represented the will of the
people for long enough to allow analysis. What is considered a democracy is a subjective and
ambiguous topic, but I use Freedom House’s country descriptions to greater understand a
country’s electoral freedom. However, even if countries are considered free democracies now, I
consider the country’s history to know when it became a democracy. For example, in Argentina
it has had periods of democratic elections, but they were interspersed with dictatorships until
1983, the point at which I start measuring midterm decline.75 A consideration of the country’s
history combined with Freedom House’s descriptions of the country’s democracy will determine
when analysis should begin.
2.1.4

Other Variables

I also consider the party environment when deciding the eligibility of a country. For a
country to be included, there must be enough parties that control of the presidency switches
between parties, but not so many that the growth and decline of parties happens too rapidly.
Having more than one party in office is essential, because it is otherwise impossible to accurately
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measure the midterm effect. If the measurement of the midterm effect only occurs with one party
in power, it is not clear whether those gains are because of an unbiased midterm effect, or
because midterms favor one party. In the United States, the electoral makeup of midterms is
whiter and older than presidential election demographics, which favors Republicans.76 If
Democrats were the only party to control the presidency, one couldn’t tell whether parties were
penalized during midterms or if Republicans just perform more favorably at midterms. In the
United States, both parties have controlled the presidency, so it’s possible to see midterm decline
impact both parties. Having lots of small parties also makes measurement of midterm decline
difficult by adding more intervening variables. This is especially true if presidents are
independents or are from a party that doesn’t have a legislative foothold. Parties must compete
legitimately for both presidential and legislative control over several election cycles.
For midterm decline to be measured, there needs to be several instances of a midterm
elections with variation in which party controls the presidency. This ensures that the sample size
is large enough that there can be some inferences about the country’s political processes.
Unfortunately, even with several elections, it is difficult to be confident about the existence of a
midterm effect without more data. Although I’m doing basic quantitative analysis, the small
sample sizes of elections suggest that a quantitative approach should be supplemented with a
more qualitative understanding of what impacts midterm elections. It’s also possible, given the
consistency in the United States, that a midterm effect could be a noticeable phenomenon with a
relatively small sample size.
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Table 1: Countries Considered for Midterm Comparison

Country

Government
System

Time
between
Presidential
elections

Argentina

President

Four years

Two Years

Concurrent election every
four years

El
Salvador

President

Five Years

Three Years

Only one concurrent
election

France

President and
Prime
Minister

The president and assembly are now elected at the same time
every five years but used to occur at different times depending on
when elections were called

Mongolia

President and
Prime
Minister

Four Years

Four Years

No concurrent elections.
Legislative elections occur
three years into every
president’s term

South
Korea

President and
Prime
Minister

Five Years

Four Years

Every twenty years a
concurrent election occurs

Portugal

President and
Prime
Minister

Five Years

Mostly four years
(sometimes elections
are more frequent

About every twenty years

Romania

President and
Prime
Minister

Five Years
(used to be
four)

Currently four years
(used to be less
consistent)

First five elections were
concurrent, but none have
been since

Benin

President and
Prime
Minister

Five Years

Four Years

Every twenty years

Cyprus

President

Five Years

Five Years

Never concurrent,
elections occur three years
into every president’s term

Time between
Legislative elections

Election Concurrency
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2.1.5

Argentina and El Salvador

Using these heuristics significantly limits the pool of potential countries that may
experience a midterm effect. Although there are several countries that have presidents, electoral
schedules that allow for midterms, and enough elections that were free and fairly competed for,
few countries have a president and no prime minister (See Table 1). It’s likely that countries with
a prime minister would still observe a midterm decline that is a reaction to the president;
however, having another prominent government figurehead may reduce the extent to which
voters use midterms to respond to the president’s party. To minimize institutional
differences and simplify the analysis, I use countries that have no prime minister.
Focusing on just presidential systems without a prime minister limits the potential pool to
El Salvador, Argentina, and Cyprus. The smaller population of Cyprus, the smaller sample size
of elections, and the ongoing conflict between southern Cyprus and Northern Cyprus, which
identifies as its own sovereign state, indicates that Cyprus isn’t as eligible for comparison. This
leaves Argentina and El Salvador, two countries with presidential systems, midterm elections, a
relatively simple party system, and free and fair democratic elections.
2.2 Analyzing the Midterm Effect
My analysis focuses on determining whether presidential parties are penalized during
midterms and what accounts for the variance in midterm decline. First, I consider the electoral
history of a party and analyze the extent to which control of the presidency hurts the party’s
success. This is done by comparing midterm elections to non-midterm elections and seeing if
midterm status explains differences in electoral performance. I then analyze midterms for all
parties and create a model to explain electoral performance with several explanatory variables.
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Using multivariate linear regression, I determine how well the variables predict midterm results,
and which variables have greater impacts on midterm success than others.
2.2.1

Measuring the Existence of the Midterm Effect

My first goal is to determine the existence and strength of midterm decline. On the most
basic level, I analyze the change from presidential election to midterm and see the share of the
vote the presidential party retains. However, since El Salvador’s midterms are not preceded by a
joint presidential-legislative election, I analyze the historical electoral success of a party and see
whether the party performs worse when they control the presidency. Although this is particularly
relevant to El Salvador, I use this method for Argentina and the United States as well. I consider
the electoral history of political party that has competed in elections throughout the entire
duration of the country’s democracy. Using a larger party has several benefits. For one,
measuring unestablished parties who win small proportions of the vote means analysis is more
susceptible to short term events, such as scandals or particularly charismatic politicians, because
small absolute vote changes have larger proportional impacts. Larger parties also have more
midterms to compare to non-midterms. Although the ratio between midterms and non-midterms
might seem inconsequential, having a more even split allows for better analysis. For instance,
comparing two midterms to eighteen non-midterms allows the analysis to be vulnerable to the
possibility that the two midterms were anomalously good for the president’s party. Because
increases of sample sizes show diminishing returns, a greater balance is preferable. Choosing an
established party and measuring how its electoral success depends on its control of the
presidency should reveal the possibility of a midterm effect.
To measure a possible midterm effect, I principally consider votes, rather than seats.
Measuring seats is more intuitive because the number of seats a party holds matters, whereas
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there isn’t an intrinsic importance in having votes that don’t translate into seats. However, using
seats as the litmus test isn’t feasible because of variance in electoral systems. This variance
means that seat results in one country can’t be easily compared to another country. The United
States uses a plurality system of allocating seats from votes, whereas El Salvador and Argentina
use proportional representation. Even within countries with proportional representation there is
variance. Both El Salvador and Argentina have multi-member districts with a single nontransferable vote. However, Argentina’s party lists are closed (unlike El Salvador’s), and El
Salvadorian voters can show preference for specific candidates.77 El Salvador’s Hare method
overrepresents small parties and Argentina’s d’Hondt method favors large parties in their
allocation of votes to seats.78 A seat represents different levels of support in different countries.
To account for variation in electoral system, I measure votes. Even without the need to compare
one country to another, it makes sense to use votes to more adequately measure the midterm
effect. For instance, in the United States, a president could get a smaller share of the
congressional vote than in a previous election, but still gain seats. To more adequately measure
changes in election performance and allow for a standard way of measuring the midterm effect
between countries, I focus on changes in votes. This allows my measurement heuristic to more
closely match voter behavior.
To create a more accurate measurement of the midterm effect I measure the vote
performance relative to other electoral performances. For instance, in the United States I measure
electoral success as the vote share won as a percentage of the previous vote received. If the
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Democratic party were to get 50% of the vote one election, and 45% of the vote the next
election, it would mean they received 90% of their previous vote share. This makes it so that
parties with different levels of political support can be compared. Otherwise, if a party were to
increase their performance from 20% in one election to 40% in the next one, it would consider
that performance worse than a party that had declined from 65% to 45%. Success is
contextualized in reference to the party’s previous performance. Measuring performance by the
percentage of total votes won, rather than raw vote totals also prevents variance in turnout from
impacting results. Although turnout is significantly impacted by midterm status, I am more
concerned with how the party does in relation to other parties, rather than how many fewer
people turnout to vote. Measuring an election through vote percentage in reference to other
elections from the same party means I can accurately measure potential changes that a midterm
effect could create.
While measuring electoral performance in reference to recent election allows for greater
country to country comparisons, it is less clear what elections should be the comparison point. In
the United States, the midterm effect is often considered in reference to the most recent election.
Because the election preceding a midterm election always coincides with a presidential election,
comparison between midterm and non-midterm is simple. While possible in United States and
Argentina, this isn’t feasible when the electoral schedules of the president and the legislative
body are staggered. In El Salvador, the presidential elections occur every five years, while the
Legislative Assembly elections occur every three years. Choosing the most recent election would
sometimes mean considering a midterm in the context of a presidential election, but at other
times I would be using another midterm election as comparison. Comparing a midterm election
to another midterm provides no insight to differences in performance between midterms and
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non-midterms. So, for El Salvador, I compare the midterm result to the most recent election of an
alternative type. I compare midterm elections for a given party to elections in which that party
did not control the presidency and compare non-midterms to midterms. This method allows for a
simple comparison that makes clear distinctions between midterms and non-midterms
With performance more clearly measurable I use a two-sample t-test to determine the
significance of differences between midterms and non-midterms. With both of the samples
(midterms and non-midterms), I focus on the mean performance, and the variance around that
performance. The larger the difference between the two means, and the smaller the variance, the
more likely there is a midterm effect. This is encapsulated in the p-value, which can more
objectively measure the statistical significance of differences between two samples. The p-value
demonstrates the likelihood of the null hypothesis, which states there’s no statistically significant
difference between the samples. For instance, a p-value of 0.10 means there’s a ninety percent
chance the differences in the samples haven’t occurred by chance. Although there isn’t a clear
delineation of what is and isn’t statistically significant, lower p-values represent higher
significance, and 0.05 is a rough and commonly used goal.
Comparing between countries is difficult because of the extent of intervening variables.
This scale of midterm decline is dependent on the share of independents in a country, the normal
variance from one election to another, the stability of political parties, and scores of other
explanatory variables. This prohibits making blanket statements like midterms hurt the president
more in El Salvador than in Argentina, if both have statistically significant impacts. The goal
should be to answer whether a country sees a midterm effect, not to show that the referendum
model penalizes presidential parties more in one country than another.
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2.2.2

Understanding Variance in the Midterm Effect

While determining whether a country observes a midterm effect has value for its own
sake, understanding the causes of the midterm effect provide further understanding. To
determine the causes, I consider all midterms from any party, with the dependent variable set to
the performance of the president’s party. I measure the performance by the vote percentage in
comparison to the previous election. Depending on the availability of data, I consider the
explanatory impact of the current congressional makeup, the economy, the president’s approval
rating, the amount of time since the most recent presidential election, and the president’s share of
the vote in the most recent election. The explanatory model will shed light on how predictable a
midterm election is based on these variables, and what variables impact the presidential party’s
success the most.
The first independent variable I consider is the share of seats the presidential party
controls before a midterm. This seat control is typically inversely correlated with midterm
performance when performance is measured as absolute seat changes. For countries without
congressional elections coinciding with presidential ones, considering the number of seats held is
important for context. Consider two parties that both have lost twenty percent of their seats. The
party that previously had 80% of the legislature’s seats and lost twenty percent would see it as a
reversion to the mean. A party that had 30% of the seats and lost twenty seats would instead see
it as a particularly poor performance.
The next factor is the president’s share of the vote they won in their presidential election.
Ordinarily this correlates inversely with midterm performance because of surge and decline. If
the president does well, they bring their success to congressional races, the president’s party wins
seats, and there’s more room for the party to regress in the midterm. By controlling for the
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previous seats held, the president’s election day support, and not the impact of the surge, will be
measured. When controlling for the seats won, the success of the current president in the most
recent presidential election further predicts midterm decline.79 Voters who anticipate the
president’s win, which may be indicated by presidential success, will preemptively vote against
the president’s party in congress to balance the president’s power.80 Therefore, in predictable,
landslide presidential elections, the coattails won’t be proportional to the scale of the president’s
win.81 Higher presidential election success means a less competitive election, and therefore more
opportunity for voters to balance the president’s power during the presidential election, rather
than the midterm.
Also, although the connection between presidential election success and future approval
ratings isn’t well documented, the relationship between approval ratings and presidential success
at reelection is extremely close.82 The relationship suggests that in El Salvador, where approval
ratings aren’t consistently documented, including presidential success in the midterm model may
serve as a stand-in for presidential approval.
Presidential approval serves as the third variable in the midterm model. This variable fits
into the referendum model of midterm decline. Unfortunately, presidential approval rating data
isn’t always available and its reliance on polling means there is inherently error in the
measurement. In the United States this error can be standardized by using the same public
opinion poll over time. For the United States I use Gallup’s polls because they go back as far as
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Harry Truman and have asked the question in the same way over time.83 In some countries,
however, there have only recently been public approval polls, and they haven’t been asked in the
same standardized way over time. Furthermore, different polls might bias the results in different
ways, and unlike in the United States, where there are presidential approval polls in the week
leading up to the midterm, several months or even years may separate presidential approval polls
outside of the U.S. It is inherently a noisy indicator of the president’s true support. For countries
that have approval polls for the majority of their elections, I measure approval as the rating that
is closest to the midterm election (but before the election). For countries that don’t have enough
approval polls to make meaningful inferences, I won’t add them to model. Quantitatively trying
to understand the relationship between approval ratings and midterm elections wouldn’t show
much insight with just a handful of elections, so I instead consider approval polls more
qualitatively.
The state of the economy also matters to the referendum model. Voters view the
economy as an indicator of the president’s success and will vote for or against the president’s
party depending on the handling of the economy. It isn’t clear how to measure the strength of the
economy. Most research on the midterm effect uses changes in real disposable income per capita
rather than inflation, unemployment, or other indicators.84 This value is the amount of income
available to households after taxes. Unfortunately, while this is tracked in the United States, it
isn’t measured in El Salvador and Argentina to the same extent and for as long. I use changes in
gross national income per capita (adjusted for inflation) as a stand-in. While GNI data is more
readily available, and is similar to real disposable income, it is possible that different countries
have different indicators that are more important. Argentina has historically struggled with
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skyrocketing inflation rates, so I also measure the impact inflation has on the success of a
presidential party during the midterms. Although inflation is already encapsulated in Argentina’s
GNI per growth rates, it’s possible the inflation rate may be more visible to voters and outweigh
GNI changes.
The final variable I measure is the number of years since the presidential election. For
Argentina and the United States, this is the same for every election, but for El Salvador, the
elections are staggered. Research from midterm-like effects abroad suggest the longer it has been
since the presidential election, the worse the president’s party will do. It’s possible that the
presidential surge might continue through the time immediately following the election and
slowly subside over time. Furthermore, presidential approval tends to diminish over time, so the
referendum model would suggest midterms further removed from the president’s election would
be worse for the president’s party. This is a relatively straightforward variable with the time
measured as the amount of years rounded to the nearest half year.
Once the variable values are determined, I create a multivariate linear regression model to
explain the midterm success of the president’s party. I first consider the overall R2 value of the
model. This details how much of the variance in midterm elections can be explained by the given
variables. Higher R2 values indicate more explanatory power of the midterm model and suggests
the role of short-term factors and other variables is smaller. While I could add a litany of other
explanatory variables to increase the R2 value, I intentionally keep the set of variables minimal. I
next consider how much each individual variable impacts midterm success. This helps explain
whether the midterms are accounted for by one or two variables in particular, or all of the
variables to some extent. This allows us to see which variables matter most in a midterm
election.
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These results lend themselves better to inter-country comparisons. Although I can’t
meaningfully compare R2 values, it’s likely some countries may be more explained by the
midterm fundamentals than others, and that these differences are worth examining. It’s possible
that in El Salvador, midterms are entirely dependent on the personalities of the congressional
candidates, whereas in Argentina the fundamentals go a long way in deciding how the
presidential party will do during a midterm. The impact of the individual variables also sheds
light on what matters in midterms between countries. For instance, one country might have
midterms that are entirely dependent on the referendum model, while another country’s
midterms might not be impacted by the state of the economy or the approval of the president.
Understanding which variables matter in which countries helps explain how midterm decline
varies from country to country.
2.3 Models and Data
In testing how midterm status effects election outcomes, I use Welch’s two sample t-test
to measure whether the difference between midterms and non-midterms is statistically
significant. The dependent variable is the portion of the previous vote percentage won from the
most recent election.85 I gather election data in the United States from the clerk of the House,
which tracks election data from 1920 to the present.86 For El Salvador I primarily use Nohlen’s
Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook, but supplement it with data from El Salvador’s
supreme electoral tribunal and Adam Carr’s election archives because the book was published in
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2005.87 For Argentina, I also use Nohlon’s data handbook, supplementing it with Argentina’s
national electoral directorate for 2009-2017.88 I analyze the mean values of the midterm and nonmidterm samples and the statistical significance of the differences.
For explaining the variance in midterm success, I use the linear model:
Yi = β0 + β1Ei + β2 Ai + β3 SCi + β4 PSi89
Where:
Yi = Proportion of the past popular legislative vote percentage received by the president’s party;
Ei = Changes in the state of the economy in the year leading up to the midterm election;
Ai = Approval rating of the president going into the midterm election;
SCi = Seat control of the president’s party going into the midterm election;
PSi = Presidential vote share won by the president in the most recent presidential election.

I particularly analyze the extent to which the individual variables have a statistically
significant relationship with the vote performance and note in which direction they influence
midterm outcomes. In measuring the impact of a given variable, I reduce the number of other
variables in the model to see if the relationship between the dependent variable and an
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independent variable remains significant with a simpler model. I also consider the R2 value of the
linear model, to see how much of the variance is explained by the variables included.
For the state of the economy I implement several indicators for Argentina and El
Salvador, while sticking with real disposable income in the United States gathered from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.90 In Argentina and El Salvador I particularly focus on
unemployment, changes in GNI per capita, and inflation from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
(FRED), Knoema, Worldbank, YCharts, and Focus Economics. 91 Presidential vote performance
of the most recent election was gathered from Nohlen’s Data Handbook and Phespos’ election
archives for both Argentina and El Salvador, while for the United States it was gathered from the
Clerk of the House.92 Finally, I gathered approval ratings in the United States from Gallup, but
in Argentina, they were gathered from several sources, largely the New York Times.93
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3. The United States
The United States is the first country I consider in my analysis. Its long history of
democratic elections allows for a larger sample size, while the prominent role of the president in
the government and in his party suggests voters may react to the state of the government through
the president’s party. Finally, the consistent electoral rules over the entire time span and the
straightforward setup of two consistent political parties limits the intervening variables. These
attributes warrant the United States’ inclusion, and I consider the elections from 1948 to 2018.
The results show a consistent midterm decline, with the president’s party typically winning
between 90 and 95 percent of their vote proportion from the previous election year. In terms of
explaining the variance in midterm success, my four variable model was able to explain some of
the variation in midterm outcomes but failed to show statistical significance for any of the
variables except for approval ratings. This explanatory power of approval ratings endorses the
referendum model as a primary predictor of midterm decline; however, the role of the economy
seems to be less prominent than that of presidential approval. Surge and decline effects were not
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statistically significant when midterm outcomes were measured via the proportion of the
previous vote won. Although holding more seats led to a larger seat decline the following year it
didn’t increase the proportional vote loss. Finally, Erikson’s test of analyzing the relationship
between concurrent and non-concurrent election results suggests the United States experiences a
presidential penalty.
The United States observes a consistent midterm decline that has seen few exceptions
over the past 70 years. But, while the existence of midterm decline is clear, the midterm model
failed to explain a significant amount of the variance in presidential party success at midterms
and failed to clearly point to one model of midterm decline.
3.1 Justification for Inclusion
The midterm effect was first measured in the United States, and the breadth of research
on the topic suggests it’s ripe for analysis. For one, the United States has a long history of free,
competitive elections that allow a larger sample size of election data. Although democracy in the
United States has been said to have faltered in the past several years, my use of popular vote
instead of House of Representative seats or electoral college returns can ameliorate some of these
challenges. Though some flaws of American democracy cannot be resolved through
methodological changes, elections remain a legitimate litmus test of the will of the public. The
political institutions of the United States make it an optimal case for analysis. The president is
seen as the main figurehead and leader of the country and his party, allowing for the state of the
government to be seen as a reflection on the president, and therefore his party. The House of
Representatives is up for election every two years, meaning that elections alternate between
being concurrent and nonconcurrent with presidential elections, allowing for a possible surge and
decline. Finally, only two political parties have held significant power in the past century,
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meaning election-to-election changes will more closely reflect a possible midterm effect, rather
than the creation and rise of a new political party. Research on the midterm effect began in the
United States and will be the springboard for my analysis.
3.1.1

Electoral History and Extent of Freedom

The United States is the world’s oldest existing democracy. Since the ratification of its
constitution in 1788, elections to the House of Representatives have been regularly scheduled
and competed for. Freedom House has considered the United States “free” for the entirety of
Freedom House’s existence.94 In 2019, Freedom House gives the United States’ electoral
processes a score of 10/12. The most significant problems cited were the power of the electoral
college over the popular vote, Russian meddling in the 2016 election, potential coordination
between Donald Trump and the Russian government, and gerrymandering.95 While these may be
problematic, who becomes president has less bearing on my analysis than what happens to their
party after they become president. Furthermore, I measure presidential success via the popular
vote percentage received of the sitting president, rather than the electoral college. This means a
president who lost the popular vote will look different from a more electorally successful
president. The events of Russian meddling and potential Trump collusion may pose problems to
democracy, but the scope was limited to 2016, and didn’t significantly impact 2018. Because I’m
not analyzing presidential races, 2016 won’t substantively impact midterm analysis.
Gerrymandering, a problem that skews the translation of votes into seats is accommodated by
using popular vote changes, rather than changes in seats. I do use seats as the control metric for
current legislative power, rather than votes, but this is necessary because explanations of surge
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and decline, exposure, and governmental balancing are based on seat control, not the most recent
popular vote.
Political pluralism in the United States receives a score of 14/16, losing points due to the
role of money in politics and racial discrimination in voting practices.96 These certainly influence
the extent to which elections are a legitimate litmus test of the will of the people. However,
discrimination in voting processes isn’t a new phenomenon in the United States and likely won’t
obscure the validity of changes in electoral success from a presidential election to the midterm.
The role of money in politics is a more recent phenomenon. However, though the rise of super
PACs may influence the will of the public, it doesn’t interfere with whether the will of the people
translates into votes.
A final argument for inclusion of the United States may be the breadth of research that
has already analyzed the United States. The midterm effect itself was first researched and
demonstrated with U.S. elections. Although the electoral processes in the United States may have
weakened in the past several years, U.S. elections remain a litmus test for the will of the people.
3.1.2

The President

The United States is a presidential system, and the role of the president in the United
States is significant. The president is head of state, head of government, and the commander-in
chief of military forces. The president is also in charge of the executive branch, meaning she
appoints the department heads, and is in charge of executing and enforcing Congress’s laws. The
president also has the power to veto laws passed by Congress, and the 2/3 requirement to
overturn the veto is a significant hurdle. The president’s power makes him the most prominent
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figurehead of the government, and the successes and failures of the government are commonly
traced back to him.
The United States president is also a figurehead within the party. They tend to have
served at an elected position at the federal level before their ascension to the presidency, and
once elected, become a leader within the party.97 Presidents tend to have high favorability within
their own party, and in modern political history, no incumbent president has ever lost his parties’
nomination process. Furthermore, with the notable exception of Donald Trump, presidential
candidates are typically chosen with significant influence of party insiders and leaders in what is
often referred to as the “invisible primary”. The president’s closeness to his party, their high
approval within the party, and the influence of party insiders in the nomination process indicate
that the president is a figurehead of the party.
The president can serve a maximum of two four-year terms after electoral reforms
following Franklin Roosevelt’s death. After a primary to choose the candidates from each party,
the presidents compete in the general election. The United States is unique in its use of the
Electoral College, which awards different states a different allocation of “points” depending on
the state’s population. This system allows for the president to lose the popular vote but win the
electoral college, and therefore the presidency. Because this convolutes the ability to compare
one electoral success to another, I use the percent of the popular vote a candidate receives to
represent the president’s success. Although most presidential elections involve just two parties,
making measurement of presidential success easier, presidential elections like 1992 will
underrate the president’s support because of the rise of a third party.
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3.1.3

The Legislative Branch

The United States’ legislative branch is bicameral. It has an upper house, the Senate, and
a lower house, the House of Representatives. The Senate is made up of 100 seats, with every
state electing two representatives to serve and represent their state for six-year terms. Because
the Senate serves six-year terms, it means the political alignment of the seats up for election in
the Senate are different every two years, making it difficult to measure changes from election to
election. Instead the House of Representatives provides a better litmus test for potential midterm
decline. There are 435 seats in the House of Representatives, with each of the seats representing
somewhat equivalent population groups. Gerrymandering poses a significant problem to relying
on seats as a metric for election to election changes, but I use the popular vote within the House
of Representative elections to measure midterm decline.
I begin my midterm analysis with the 1948 election of Harry Truman. This date is chosen
because it matches when Gallup began asking about presidential approval in a consistent way.
Furthermore, with seventy years of elections, far more than the election sample sizes of
Argentina and El Salvador, inferences should become apparent. I consider eighteen midterms
and presidential elections by analyzing the change in the House popular vote from the
presidential election to the ensuing midterm.
3.1.4

Political Parties in the United States

The party landscape of the United States is relatively straightforward and allows for a
significant limitation on external intervening variables. Since the Civil War, there have been only
two political parties that have wielded significant power: The Democratic Party, and the
Republican Party. Presidential power tends to consistently alternate between the parties, with
neither power maintaining the presidency for much more than a decade in this time span.
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Although the Senate and especially the House of Representatives have gone through longer
periods of control by one party, the seat makeup tends to change from election to election.
Because only two parties have dominated during the duration of the analysis, the successes and
failures of one party are inversely related to the other party. This limits scenarios where the
growth of a third party makes a significant impact on the analysis. America’s consistent twoparty system allows for clear analysis of short-term changes related to the midterm effect.
3.2 Results
Elections in the United States paint the picture of an extremely consistent disadvantage
for the president’s party. In the eighteen midterm elections since 1948, the president’s party
worsened their vote percentage in all but one election. On average, the president’s party won just
under 93 percent of the vote percent they won the previous election. This midterm decline can be
clearly seen when focusing on just one party’s success over time. When it wasn’t a midterm,
Republicans won 102% of their previous seats, but only won 93% of their seats when it was a
midterm. This difference was statistically significant (p = 0.000151). There is some redundancy
in the measurements. Midterm decline effects both values, because some of the non-midterm
elections are measured in relation to a midterm where they controlled the presidency, allowing
for more opportunity for improvement. Distinguishing between presidential elections and
elections where the Democrats controlled the midterm created an even clearer picture of midterm
decline. For Republicans they won 110% of their previous seats when the other party controlled
the presidency at a midterm, 99% during a presidential election, and 93% when controlling the
presidency during midterms. While these differences aren’t huge, they are consistent and
statistically significant.

47 Gans
The model explaining the variance in midterm success shows that many of the
mechanisms of midterm decline aren’t statistically significant, and that elections are difficult to
predict with a small set of fundamentals. The model, which uses presidential approval ratings,
changes in real disposable income, previous seats, and presidential success, explains some of the
variation in midterm success (R2 = .44). Only approval rating significantly impacts midterm
success (p = 0.0416). However, other variables work in the direction that theory would imply,
even if the impact wasn’t statistically significant. For instance, positive changes in real
disposable income led to higher midterm performance, while higher seat totals led to more seat
loss in the ensuing election. Higher performance of the president in his most recent presidential
election led to a greater loss in the ensuing midterm. Although these values weren’t statistically
significant, it’s possible small methodological changes or more data would lead to statistical
significance. For instance, previous analysis of midterm effects use seat change rather than vote
change. Removing the variable denoting presidential success also showed a relationship between
income changes and midterm outcomes that showed greater statistical significance (p = .075).
While I’m convinced votes are a better measure of election-to-election changes, using seat
change as the dependent variable showed a clearer connection between the independent and
dependent variables. For instance, the influence of income changes and approval ratings on
midterm decline is more significant (p = 0.00521 for approval ratings, and p = 0.00671 for
income changes). However, it’s important to remember that our chosen methodological approach
of considering vote changes is intentional and didn’t show the same level of impact. Midterms
penalize the president’s party, but the causes aren’t clear.
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Table 2: Explaining Vote Proportion Retained by President’s Party: U.S.
Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Standard Error

tStat

P-value

Intercept

0.9311707

0.1304494

7.138

7.61e-06 ***

Approval Rating (%)

0.2327198

0.1029645

2.260

0.0416 *

0.0070466

0.0047958

1.469

0.1655

-0.2234596

0.1832815

- 1.219

0.2444

-0.0001436

0.0002947

- 0.487

0.6341

Change in Real
Disposable Income (%)
Previous Presidential
Vote (%)
Previous Seats

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Multiple R-Squared: 0.4432, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2719
N: 18, Residual standard error: 0.03791 on 13 degrees of freedom

Table 3: Explaining Seat Proportion Retained by President’s Party: U.S.
Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Standard Error

tStat

P-value

Intercept

0.8019830

0.2040614

3.930

.00173 **

Approval Rating (%)

0.5396946

0.1610669

3.351

0.00521 **

0.0241530

0.0075020

3.220

0.00671 **

- 0.3144824

0.2867064

- 1.097

0.29260

- 0.0004809

0.0004609

- 1.043

0.31581

Change in Real
Disposable Income (%)
Previous Presidential
Vote (%)
Previous Seats

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Multiple R-Squared: 0.6734, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5729
N: 18, Residual standard error: 0.0593 on 13 degrees of freedom

Table 4: Midterm Performance vs. Non-Midterm Performance: U.S.
Midterm Status

Mean Proportion of
Previous Vote Percentage

Standard
Deviation

Mean Proportion of
Previous Seats

Standard
Deviation

Midterm

93.2

4.75

88.9

9.32

Non-Midterm

102.0

8.51

105.0

14.9

49 Gans

Figure 1: Midterms and Non-Midterms in the United States
As can be seen in the box plot, elections go worse for the Republican party when controlling
the presidency. Although one election has resulted in a vote gain, the majority of midterm
elections result in a vote loss of around five to ten percent
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Figure 2: Midterm Performance 1950-2018)
In midterm elections, presidential parties tend to worsen their vote performance. Both
Republicans (red with vertical stripes), and Democrats (blue with horizontal stripes) suffer
when controlling the presidency.
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Figure 3: Republican Party Vote Change (Midterms Highlighted)
By looking at the electoral history of the Republican party, it becomes clear that midterms
(red vertical lines) result in vote losses more consistently than non-midterms (green horizontal
lines).
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3.3 Analysis
3.3.1

The Effect

The history of midterms in the United States demonstrates that presidential parties are
penalized during midterm elections but fails to show a clear mechanism for the effect. This lack
of clarity on the causes of midterm decline is paralleled in midterm research. Throughout the late
20th century, different models of midterm decline emerged and competed to explain the
phenomenon, with one paper commonly refuting the findings of another. This failure to settle on
an agreed upon explanation for midterm decline demonstrates the difficulty of measuring the
effect and suggests the possibility that many theories combine to explain the historical
disadvantage of the president’s party.
The difficulty of settling on one explanation for midterm decline can be explained by the
impact different methodologies have on the results. For instance, when I used the real disposable
income changes in the two years leading up to the midterm election as my economy heuristic, no
explanatory variable had a statistically significant impact on midterm outcomes. However, using
the income changes in the year leading up to the midterm showed a more significant relationship.
Other research by Bartels shows that growth rates in the two quarters or even few months leading
up to a midterm election have an even stronger impact on voting behavior.98 Similarly, the
decision to use votes as the dependent variable rather than seats limited the statistical
significance of the explanatory variables. The results’ vulnerability to methodological changes
illustrates that although explanations for the midterm effect may be grounded in reality, there’s
enough intervening variables that understanding the weight of these explanations is difficult. The
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role of intervening variables is also explained in the low R2 value of the model (.44). Being able
to only explain a relatively small share of the variance indicates that there are many variables
impacting midterm success that go beyond approval ratings, the economy, and previous seat
totals. The lack of statistically significant explanatory variables suggests no single model of
midterm decline can be fully endorsed.
3.3.2

The Referendum Model

My model suggests the referendum model plays a part in midterm elections in the United
States. However, while the impact of approval ratings on midterm success of the president’s
party is evident, the relationship between the economy and midterm outcomes isn’t as strong. In
all variations of the model I tested, approval ratings had a statistically significant (p < 0.05)
correlation with midterm success. Positive changes in real disposable income are associated with
higher midterm performance by the president’s party, but the relationship wasn’t particularly
significant. Measuring income changes in the year leading up to the midterm election led to a
more significant relationship than longer or shorter time spans. Although vote changes weren’t
highly correlated with income changes, changes in real disposable income had a significant
impact on midterm success when measured by seats (p = 0.00671). This helps explain why
previous research, using seats as the dependent variable, shows a connection between income
and midterms.
The questionable influence of the economy is corroborated by previous literature.
Campbell argues that economic conditions at the time of the election have no statistically
significant role in midterm elections, and when dropped from the model, have no effect on the
variance explained by the model.99 He shows the economy impacts the president’s approval
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rating and therefore influences elections, but denies a direct correlation.100 Erikson argues that
while economic conditions affect the president during his reelection bid, they don’t notably
impact the president’s party during midterm.101 Though skepticism of the economy’s role in
midterm elections isn’t uncommon, most argue the referendum model still explains variance in
midterm decline. The connection between the economy and midterms may exist, but it isn’t clear
or pronounced enough to be resistant to methodological changes.
3.3.3

Surge and Decline/Mean Reversion

Although the seat control going into a midterm had an inverse relationship with the
midterm success of the president’s party, it isn’t statistically significant. Modifying the collection
of independent variables for analysis had minor impacts on the relationship but not to the extent
that a convincing relationship emerged. This contradicts previous research on surge and decline,
which considers surge and decline a prime component of midterm decline. Much of this
imbalance between previous research and my analysis lies in methodological differences.
Variance in methodological approaches, specifically in the dependent variable, impact surge and
decline and mean reversion models.
While previous research on midterm decline measures presidential party success through
absolute changes in seats, I use proportional changes in votes. Using absolute seat changes will
reflect a greater surge and decline, because with more seats, there can be greater absolute
changes. Losing 20 seats is more possible when holding 280 seats than when holding 100 seats,
so there should be correlation between more seat control and future seat loss. However, by using
votes, I’m measuring whether controlling more seats causes a greater proportional loss, rather
than an absolute loss. My model shows that holding more seats going into a midterm is
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correlated with an increase in the number of seats that will be lost, but not an increase in
proportional vote loss.
My analysis shows that beyond mean reversion, presidential parties aren’t particularly
punished by holding lots of seats. Holding more seats means they can lose more seats, which
mean reversion would predict. However, holding more seats doesn’t lead to a larger proportional
loss, and there doesn’t seem to be a significant pushback from voters punishing parties for
controlling more seats. This contradiction of former research on the midterm experience can be
attributed to different ways of measuring midterm performance.
3.3.4

Presidential Penalty

Erikson’s presidential penalty model suggests that the mobilization of opposition support
and the desire for governmental balance punishes presidential parties. However, because this
feature is intrinsic to all midterms, it’s difficult to test for. Despite this difficulty, Erikson
suggests different models of midterm decline result in different relationships between the
presidential party’s congressional success during a concurrent election and two years later in a
midterm. Erikson suggests relationships similar to the ones in Figure 4, where the y axis is the
vote performance during the midterm, and the x axis is the performance during the previous
election. Dots below the line on the chart represent situations of midterm decline where the party
worsens on their previous vote performance. Mean reversion shows a largely uncorrelated
relationship, and most instances of midterm decline occur when the previous vote performance is
above 50% and there’s more room to revert to the mean. In the surge and decline model,
midterm election performance is typically in the narrower range of 45% - 55%, but with greater
variation in the presidential election due to presidential excitement. In the referendum model,
there’s some correlation between presidential results and midterm results. Presidents that
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Figure 4: Erikson’s Theoretical Electoral Results of Different Midterm Models
Erikson suggests that the relationship between presidential party vote during the presidential
election and in the ensuing midterm can hint at the existence of different midterm models.
Erikson’s presidential penalty model is one where presidential and midterm electoral
performance by the president’s party are correlated, but midterm performance lags behind
presidential election performance by a consistent amount.
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bring congressional success to their party may be more likely to be popular presidents, and
therefore perform better in the referendum model of midterms. However, this connection isn’t
direct, so it’s possible for presidential parties to improve on their midterm performance,
particularly if their previous performance wasn’t too high. Erikson’s presidential penalty model
shows high correlation between presidential success and the ensuing midterm success, but with
midterm elections consistently a few percentage points lower.

Figure 5: Presidential Party Performance in Concurrent and Non-Concurrent Elections
The electoral results of presidential parties in the election before and during a midterm closely
matches Erikson’s presidential penalty scenario, where election outcomes are correlated, but
midterms are several percentage points worse.
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Erikson analyzed election data from 1946-1986 to show that his presidential penalty
model more closely resembles historical election data than the other models. Adding the past
thirty years of elections shows a relationship that even more closely resembles Erikson’s
presidential penalty model (Figure 5). There’s close correlation between a presidential party’s
congressional vote during presidential elections and during midterms, but the midterm
performance is consistently several percentage points worse than that of the presidential race. In
the other three midterm models, midterm decline occurs when the performance during the
presidential race is lower. However, Erikson’s model suggests that low presidential performance
will be followed by even lower performance during the midterms. Though the graph matches
Erikson’s theoretical relationship of the presidential penalty model, it shouldn’t diminish the role
of other models or confirm the existence of an inevitable presidential penalty. Instead, it suggests
that midterms punish presidential parties a consistent amount, even when their performance
during the presidential election was poor.
3.4 United States and its Midterms
Though the United States may have a larger sample size of democratic elections than El
Salvador and Argentina, a relatively straightforward party system, and a breadth of research,
explanations for the midterm effect still seem somewhat indeterminate. While my model and
analysis may show the existence of a midterm effect, there remains ambiguity over the extent to
which different variables impact the variance in midterm performance. The approval rating
aspect of the referendum model works well even as the role of the economy is less significant.
While higher seat control during a presidential election is typically associated with larger seat
loss during a midterm, the proportional performance of parties isn’t significantly correlated with
previous seat totals. Though Erikson’s model of a theoretical presidential penalty closely
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matches the past seventy years of elections, it’s hard to measure an inevitable phenomenon that
can’t be rigorously tested. The lack of certainty is paralleled in the academic literature on the
midterm effect, which fails to agree on the role different models have in explaining midterm
success. This is partially due to the role methodology has in shaping results. Modifying the set of
independent variables or varying how the dependent variable is measured can impact which
variables are significant. Rather than one model that explains midterm decline, it’s likely the
models combine to explain the regularity of midterm decline. Midterm decline is apparent, but
there remains uncertainty over the role different midterm models play in midterm decline.
4. Argentina
I next consider Argentina. Its election schedule and governmental system most closely
resembles that of the United States, with presidential elections occurring every four years, and
congressional elections occurring every two years. The president also has a prominent role, and
although there have been three parties to control the presidency, parties have stayed relatively
consistent from election to election. These attributes warrant Argentina’s inclusion, and I
consider nine pairs of elections beginning in 1983.
The results show a midterm decline that is as consistent as that of the United States but
leads to a larger loss of the presidential party’s vote. In the United States, the presidential party
typically loses 5-10% of their previous vote, whereas in Argentina the mean is around 20%. In
terms of explaining the variance in midterm success, my four variable model was able to explain
a significant amount of the variation in midterm outcomes, showing statistical significance for
two of the variables and nearing significance on the other two. The referendum model operates
similarly to in the United States, with approval ratings being more explanatory than the economy
– although both variables are more significant in Argentina than in the United States. Surge and
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decline highly predicts the proportion of the vote retained from one election to the next. Holding
more seats led to a higher number of seats lost in the subsequent election and a higher
proportional vote loss. Finally, Erikson’s test for presidential penalty doesn’t match the election
results in Argentina in the way it does in the United States. Argentina observes a midterm
decline that significantly hurts presidential parties, and the variance in this midterm decline can
largely be accounted for by the four fundamental variables.
4.1 Justification for Inclusion
Argentina’s electoral system, government, party landscape, and history of democracy all
strengthen its case as a viable comparison country to the United States. After attempts to
democratize the nation were largely disrupted by military coups throughout the 20th century,
Argentina reestablished a democracy in 1983 that has persevered. Like the United States,
Argentina’s president wields full control over the executive branch, and is seen as the leader of
the party both symbolically and within party structures. Argentina’s House of Representatives, or
Chamber of Deputies, largely mirrors the United States House, with elections occurring every
two years, halfway through the president’s terms. The election to this chamber will serve as the
measurement for the midterm effect. While the electoral schedules and systems have changed in
the past several decades, they have remained comparable to the United States, with the biggest
difference being proportionally allocated seats versus plurality-based single member districts.
Still, by looking at raw vote totals rather than seat makeup, I can compare the two. Finally, as in
the United States, two parties have largely competed for control, with parties mostly remaining
consistent from election to election. The exception is the years 2003 and 2005 which will be
excluded from the analysis because of difficulties in measuring the midterm effect. Given
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Argentina’s eligibility as a viable comparison, I consider nine election pairs from 1983 until
2017.
4.1.1 Electoral History and extent of freedom.
Since independence in 1816, Argentina has alternated between periods of civil unrest and
legitimate democracy.102 The most recent of these regimes of democracy was founded by the
populist Juan Peron. After World War II, Argentina elected Peron, who led until a military coup
overthrew him in 1955.103 After almost two decades of exile, he was reelected in 1973 where he
maintained the presidency for a year until he died.104 Three years later, another military coup
overthrew Isabel Peron, his wife, who had assumed power in his absence.105 At this point, the
continuous tug of war between democratically elected leaders and military coups culminated in
what is known as the Dirty War.106
The new military regime, “The Junta”, under General Jorge Rafael Videla waged a war
against subversion, silencing left-wing guerilla activity, non-violent leftist activists, and their
sympathizers.107 The government carried out wide-spread killings, tortures, and disappearances,
sporadic kidnappings of leftist sympathizers. Although the dirty war began as a publicly
supported war against leftist terrorist movements, as violence increased and more Argentines
were victim of the government’s transgressions, the public turned on the government. With the
public growing increasingly opposed to the government, mostly to its human rights violations,
the Junta declared war against Britain.108 The goal was to win control of the Falklands, and
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diminish public criticism through a successful war.109 The war achieved the opposite result, with
Britain defeating Argentina and capturing almost ten thousand prisoners of war.110 With public
opposition to the Junta’s Dirty War reinforced by the failure in the Falklands, the military regime
lifted their prohibition on political parties, and ceded power to the democratically elected Raul
Alfonsín. In 1983, modern Argentine democracy began.
From 1983 onwards, while democracy has seen flaws, elections represent the will of the
people. In the 1980s and 1990s, the most significant enemy of democracy was the military and
their ability to overthrow civilian authorities. Alfonsín spent the beginning of his term bringing
the militarists to justice.111 He created a commission to investigate the disappearances, called for
trial procedures for military leaders, and proposed bills modifying reforms to military justice
procedures.112 The opposition Justicialist party believed he did not do enough to punish the
military, but Alfonsín’s reluctance was intentional as to not provoke another coup. During the
late 1980s and early 1990s, there were four military revolts that attempted to overthrow the
government, the most significant of these an attempt following economic problems in 1990.113
The elected government survived the coups, and since then the military has held back.
The past few decades have demonstrated that Argentina’s elections represent the people’s
voice. Argentina’s weakest point democratically occurred in 2001, when the president Fernando
de La Rúa resigned, and was replaced by an unelected provincial governor, because the vice
president had also resigned.114 This provincial governor then resigned, and was replaced by a
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president from the opposition party.115 However, the 2003 presidential elections were fiercely
competed, with the sitting president opting to not run for election.116 However, for party
dynamics related reasons, I do not use the 2003 and 2005 elections anyways. On the whole,
outside of minor stumbles in regard to the military and the unelected presidents of 2001-2003,
Argentina’s elections generally reflect public opinion.
While Freedom House notes that Argentina is not a flawless democracy, the country’s
biggest problems, corruption and drug-related violence, do not significantly impact elections.117
Argentina’s drug related violence and collusion between drug ring leaders and police officers
poses a threat to the integrity of police officers more so than politicians.118 And, while corruption
scandals are common to elected representatives, the corruption typically revolves around money
laundering and other financial rule breaking, not election rigging.119 Although these issues
certainly pose problems to Argentina, they don’t directly influence the health of the electoral
system. Freedom house considers Argentina’s electoral system close to perfect, receiving a score
of 11/12. The most notable electoral problems Freedom House cites are inconsistent enforcement
of electoral and campaign finance laws, which shouldn’t interfere too much with whether
elections serve as a mandate of the public.120 Furthermore, the political pluralism in Argentina is
encouraging, receiving a score of 14/16, with several parties competing outside the influence of

115

Larry Rother, “Man in the News; Peronist for the Present; Eduardo Alberto Duhalde,” The New York Times,
accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/03/world/man-in-the-news-peronist-for-the-presenteduardo-alberto-duhalde.html.
116
Lansford, Political Handbook of the World 2015.
117
Freedom House, “Argentina,” Freedom in the World 2018, accessed March 10, 2019,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/argentina.
118
Freedom House, “Argentina.”
119
Freedom House, “Argentina.”
120
Freedom House, “Argentina.”

64 Gans
the military or foreign powers.121 On the whole, Freedom House considers Argentina a “vibrant
representative democracy, with competitive elections and lively public debate.”122
4.1.2 The President
The role of the president in Argentina is as powerful as in the United States, and, if
anything, more powerful. As commander-in-chief, head of state, and head of government, the
president exclusively exercises power of the executive branch, and has the power to appoint the
cabinet, propose bills straight to congress, declare a state of emergency or war, and can even
suspend the constitution.123 Because the president wields a vast array of institutional resources,
the legislative branch tends to take a subordinate role, helping the president largely get what they
want.124 The party in control of the presidency has largely controlled the House of
Representatives too, further limiting the opposition faced by the president. This power suggests
that the president serves as a prominent figurehead of the government and that the failures and
successes of the government can be in part attributed to her. The president has been closely tied
to her party, with the party leader largely being the nominee for the president.125 This was most
clearly seen in the early 2000s when the leadership struggle within the Justicialist Party took
place in the presidential race.126 The party could not decide who the party leader would be, so
three separate members of the Justicialist party all ran in the presidential election.127 The
extensive power of the president combined with the president’s role as the leader of the party
indicates Argentina’s elections could experience a midterm effect.
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The president can serve two four-year terms after electoral reforms in 1994 reduced the
term length from six years.128 These presidential elections include two rounds. The first round
determines which candidates will be on the second, head-to-head, round. However, if the
candidate receives over forty-five percent of the vote, or over forty percent with a ten percent
margin, they can be elected in the first round.129 When considering the president’s electoral
success as an explanatory variable, I measure the success in the first-round results. Otherwise, I
would favor presidents that did poorly in the first round and then only had to face one opponent
in the second round. Rather than having each province be worth a certain number of electoral
votes, Argentina is treated as a single large district, with the popular vote winner always
becoming the president.130 This means the president will always reflect the plurality of voting
Argentines.
4.1.3 The Legislative Branch
Argentina’s Legislative branch is bicameral, and largely resembles that of the United
States. The upper house, the Senate, is made up of 72 senators, three from each of the twentyfour districts.131 The lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, is comprised of 257 seats from all
24 districts, with the population size determining the number of seats from each district.132 The
role of the House and the Senate are largely comparable to the United States, with both chambers
playing a role in shaping laws, impacting federal revenue policies, ratifying international treaties,
and serving as a check on the president and their cabinet.133 However, the comparative power of
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the president has largely meant that the legislative branch has more limited power than the
president.134 However, in role and makeup, Argentina’s legislative branch mirrors that of the
United States.
The representatives in the Chamber of Deputies serve four-year terms, with half of the
Chamber up for election every two years.135 The Senate terms are identical to the U.S. with
Senators serving three-year terms, with one third up for reelection every two years.136 In
elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the representatives are chosen proportionally, based on the
D’Hondt method.137 The Senate seat allocation serves as a poorer representation of votes, with
the plurality vote winners receiving two seats, and the next largest party receiving one.138 This
indicates that because of its larger sample size, more frequent elections, and proportional
representation, the Chamber of Deputies will be a better indicator of midterm effects than the
Senate.
Since 1983, there have been eight presidential elections and eighteen legislative elections.
Although this number of elections should provide enough data, changing electoral rules have
made analysis slightly more difficult. At the beginning of Argentina’s democracy, presidents
served six-year terms.139 After reforms in 1994, the president’s term was shortened to 4 years.140
This complicates analysis of the midterm effect. For several years there were two midterms
during every president’s term. Fortunately, these shouldn’t get in the way of measuring the
existence of a midterm effect. For the years with two midterm elections, I measure them both as
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a distinct data point, comparing the midterm election to the most recent presidential election.
Having only half of the Chamber of Deputies up for election is a larger problem. For instance, in
the United States it is difficult to compare one Senate election to the next because the party
alignment of one election could be different from the next because the states up for election are
different. Therefore, it is difficult to measure one Senate election in comparison to the previous
one. Fortunately, around 130 seats are contested every election from 24 multi-member
proportionally chosen districts.141 This means that since every district is up for election, the
district results should be comparable year to year, meaning the national results can be compared
as well. I treat this period of alternating representative elections as being identical to the United
States. Despite electoral reform and difficulties with the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina’s
electoral schedules provide a clear comparison to the United States.
4.1.4 Political Parties in Argentina
The party landscape of Argentina is relatively straightforward. Two large parties
historically dominate: the Justicialist Party and the Radical Civic Union. The most prominent of
these is the Justicialist party, which is a catch-all party borne out of the nationalist movement led
by former president Juan Perón.142 The size has allowed the party to subvert a single ideology,
remaining largely in the center or center left on most issues.143 However, it has faced frequent
intra-party conflict and cleavages, leading to factionalization and sub-parties.144 This was most
notable in the early 2000s, when the party couldn’t agree on a single Justicialist presidential
candidate, so three ran in the 2003 election.145 Although Menem, a former president of
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Argentina, won the first round, he withdrew from the runoff, aware that he would lose to the
other Justicialist member, Néstor Kirchner.146 After the 2003 election, the party split into two
large factions, the Victory Front, and the Federal Peronist front, which competed in the 2005 and
2007 elections.147 This complicates the midterm effect. For one, voters can simultaneously vote
for and against the party controlling the presidency by choosing specific factions of the
president’s party. Because the separations between parties are ambiguous, determining what is a
vote for or against the president’s party becomes challenging. The control of the government also
isn’t clearly controlled by one cohesive party. This makes it difficult to measure whether voters
are reacting to the president or their party. The questionable Democracy of Argentina during the
early 2000s adds to the difficulty of untangling the taxonomy of political parties. Through this
period, Argentina was rated only partially free due to increased corruption and the absence of an
elected president.148 Because of these difficulties, I won’t use the election data from the 2003 and
2005 elections, resuming my analysis in the 2007 general elections. Since then the party has
largely consolidated. The Justicialist party has dominated five out of the eight presidential
elections, winning races in 1989, 1995, 2003, 2007, and 2011.
The other significant party in Argentina’s history is the Radical Civic Union, a moderate
left party that first controlled the government in 1983, after Argentina’s transition to its current
democracy.149 Despite maintaining power at the beginning of Argentina’s democracy, they have
progressively lost their power and representation within the legislature and the presidency.
Recently they have had to form alliances with other opposition parties, or offshoots of the
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Justicialist party to remain relevant.150 The most recent, and successful of these alliances
occurred in the 2015 election, when businessman Mauricio Macri combined the center-right
Republican Proposal party, the RCU, and the Civic Coalition party into the Cambiemos (“Let’s
Change”) party.151 This opposition coalition narrowly won the presidential race in 2015, and
went on to command a legislative majority in the 2017 midterms.152 Still, the Radical Civic
Union’s role in the Cambiemos party is likely subservient to the larger coalition member, the
Republican Proposal party.153 Counting the Cambiemos party as an extension of the RCU, the
RCU has won the elections of 1983, 1999, and 2015, and is currently in power.154 The alternation
in power of the Justicialist party and RCU provide a good comparison to the United States.
Having two stable parties makes it easy to measure the short-term changes that result from the
midterm effect without fundamental structural changes in party landscape intervening in the
results.
I consider Argentina’s elections from 1983 to 2017 (with 2003-2005 excluded) to see if
midterm decline takes place. The country’s legitimacy of democracy in the period combined with
an electoral schedule that closely parallels that of the United States suggests that midterm decline
may be observable.
4.2 Results
Midterm elections in Argentina go poorly for the party controlling the presidency. In the
nine midterm elections since 1983, the president’s party lost seats in all but one of them. On
average the president’s party won just under 82 percent of the vote percent they won the previous
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election. In explaining the variance in the Justicialist Party’s success, (155) the party won just
under 80 percent of their previous vote percent during a midterm and won over 112 percent of
their previous vote percentage when it was not a midterm election. Despite the small sample
sizes of elections, the differences between midterm and non-midterm elections were statistically
significant (p-value = 0.00234).
In considering explanatory variables for the variance in midterm success I consider all
midterm elections, not just those of the Justicialist Party. I created two main models to explain
the presidential party’s performance in the midterms. The first uses changes in Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita in the year leading up to the midterm election. This was chosen because
while real disposable income isn’t tracked, GNI serves as a stand-in for economic wellbeing. The
next model uses the unemployment rate, to create a more personal indicator of the economy. I
used inflation as an independent variable, but there was no correlation between inflation rates
and midterm outcomes.
The Gross National Income per capita model explained the variance in the data relatively
well, with an R2 value of just below 0.92. In this model, both approval ratings and previous seat
control were statistically significant (p = 0.016 and p = 0.0077, respectively). While previous
presidential vote was almost a significant predicter of midterm success (p = 0.13), GNI per capita
growth had no notable impact (p = 0.38). It’s worth noting that, unlike in the United States,
higher presidential performance was associated with improved midterm performance.
The unemployment-based model explained the variance in the data more closely, with an
R2 value of 0.94 and more significance in three of the four individual variables. Approval ratings
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and previous seat control were more significant (p = 0.00859 and p = 0.00266, respectively) than
in the previous model. While the relationship between unemployment and midterm outcomes
wasn’t statistically significant, (p = 0.12) the relationship was more significant than with gross
national income. Modifying the economic variable slightly reduced the significance of the
presidential vote’s impact on midterm fortunes of the president’s party (p = 0.18). On the whole,
the unemployment-based model explained more of the variation and showed greater statistical
significance for the individual variables.
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Table 5: Explaining Seat Proportion Retained by President’s Party (Unemployment %):
Argentina
Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Standard Error

tStat

P-value

Intercept

142.4751

49.6505

2.870

0.04549 *

Approval Rating (%)

0.5210

0.1083

4.810

0.00859 **

Unemployment (%)

- 1.0325

0.5341

- 1.933

0.12535

Previous Presidential
Vote (%)

1.4992

0.9304

1.611

0.18241

Previous Seat Control

- 3.2172

0.4839

- 6.648

0.00266 **

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Multiple R-squared: 0.9477, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8953
N: 9, Residual standard error: 6.515 on 4 degrees of freedom
Table 6: Explaining Seat Proportion Retained by President’s Party (Change in GNI per Capita):
Argentina
Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Standard Error

tStat

P-value

91.8701

53.0970

1.730

0.15864

0.5415

0.1343

4.031

0.01571 *

Change in GNI per
capita (%)
Previous Presidential
Vote (%)

0.4566

0.4678

0.976

0.38430

2.0939

1.0860

1.928

0.12609

Previous Seat Control

- 3.0069

0.6053

- 4.967

0.00767 **

Intercept
Approval Rating (%)

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Multiple R-squared: 0.9182, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8365
N: 9, Residual standard error: 8.143 on 4 degrees of freedom
Table 7: Midterm Performance vs. Non-Midterm Performance: Argentina
Midterm Status
Midterm
Non-Midterm

Mean Proportion of
Previous Vote Percentage
78.0
113.0

Standard
Deviation
14.1
24.9

Mean Proportion of
Previous Seats
80.0
108.0

Standard
Deviation
14.2
27.9
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Figure 6: Midterms and Non-Midterms in Argentina
As can be seen in the box plot, elections go worse for the Justicialist party when controlling
the presidency. The majority of midterm elections result in a vote loss of around fifteen to
thirty percent
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Figure 7: Midterm Performance (1985-2017)
In midterm elections, presidential parties tend to worsen their vote performance. Both the
Radical Civic Union (red with vertical stripes), and the Justicialist Party (blue with horizontal
stripes) suffer when controlling the presidency. The Cambiemos party (yellow with diagonal
lines) didn’t lose votes during their one midterm.

75 Gans

Figure 8: Justicialist Party Vote Change (Midterms Highlighted)
By looking at the electoral history of the Justicialist party, it becomes clear that midterms (red
vertical lines) result in vote losses more consistently than non-midterms (blue horizontal
lines).

76 Gans
4.3 Analysis
4.3.1 The Effect
Presidential parties are penalized in midterm elections in Argentina, winning on average
less than 82 percent of their previous vote. This is significantly less than the 93 percent of votes
typically retained in the United States. Although this doesn’t mean causes of midterm decline
matter more than in the U.S.A., it does show a significant historical disadvantage of holding the
presidency during a midterm. These midterm dips have recently been sizeable. While throughout
the 1980s and 90s, presidential parties could expect to hold 80-90 percent of their most recent
vote percentage, since 2000, there have been a few instances of presidential parties losing close
to half of their previous congressional vote during a midterm. The consistency of the effect
combined with the magnitude suggests that presidential parties fare no better in Argentina than
they do in the United States.
A significant Argentine exception to midterm decline occurred in 2017, when the
formation and growth of a party created a midterm vote gain. In 2015 Maurcio Macri was elected
from the Cambiemos party to the presidency. In 2015, a set of conservative coalitions decided to
merge into the Cambiemos party in the presidential election to increase their electability.156 In
the legislative elections the parties remained separate, despite being under the larger Cambiemos
label. This unconsolidated and unestablished nature of the Cambiemos party led to a minimal
presidential surge and a weak performance by the president’s party. In previous presidential
elections, the president’s congressional party won between 43 and 55 percent of the vote in the
Chamber of Deputies elections. However, the Cambiemos party won only 35 percent of the vote
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in 2015. This lack of a presidential surge meant that mean reversion would increase the
presidential party’s standing in another election, not decrease it. The new party further
consolidated from 2015-2017 and was able to improve upon their 2015 performance in 2017,
largely thanks to the limited presidential surge in 2015. The foundation and success of the
Cambiemos party shows the role of surge and decline and highlights the complication of
measuring midterm effects with the sudden growth of a party.
4.3.2 The Referendum Model
Argentine midterm elections conform to the referendum model relatively well. As in the
United States, approval ratings have greater explanatory power than the state of the economy.
Modifications to the number of variables, and which economic indicator I use impacts the
significance of the relationship between midterms and approval, but not to the extent that
approval ratings lose their significance (p < 0.05). Regardless of which economic indicator is
used, no significant relationship between the economy and midterm elections emerges. That said,
unemployment explains the variance in midterm decline better than unemployment, while
inflation shows little correlation at all with midterm outcomes. This seems to mirror the
phenomenon in the United States. While approval ratings seem closely tied to the presidential
performance during midterms, the economy seems to have only a tenuous relationship to
midterm performance.
When anecdotally considering specific elections, the referendum model seems to do a
decent job of explaining outcomes, but it’s likely that the saliency of the economy varies from
election to election. In the leadup to the 1987 midterm elections, Argentina faced particularly
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high inflation rates and president Alfonsín’s approval rating dropped to 25%.157 Alfonsín’s
Radical Civic Union (RCU) party went on to lose their majority, winning only 80% of their 1983
vote. Another example is the 2001 election, during the Argentine Great Depression.
Unemployment was north of 15 percent, the Argentine economy was on its way to becoming the
largest national economy to default, and president de la Rúa’s approval rating was in the single
digits.158 The 2001 legislative elections were such a repudiation of de la Rua’s party that the
RCU lost half of the votes they won at the most recent election, and in several districts “None of
the Above” beat out de la Rua on the ballot.159 Despite the lack of statistical significance, the
economy has impacted the fortunes of presidential parties during midterms.
While the economy matters in Argentina, presidential parties have escaped poor midterm
performance despite a weak economy. In 1985, the GNI per capita shrunk by six percent and
inflation was at 600%, yet Raul Alfonsín’s party nearly retained its entire vote percentage from
two years before.160 Several years later, in 1993 unemployment was at 16.8, close to the levels
seen in the Argentine great depression. Yet, Menem’s party went on to win almost 95% of his
vote from 1989 and improve upon his 1991 performance when unemployment was a mere six
percent. The economy matters, but the extent of intervening variables and issues of salience to
voters obscures any one-to-one relationship between the economy and midterm performance.
4.3.3 Surge and Decline/Mean Reversion
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The previous joint presidential-congressional election influences the share of vote that is
retained in the next election. Unsurprisingly, as a presidential candidate carries more of her party
companions to victory in congressional elections, it becomes harder to sustain the performance
for another year. Elections in Argentina also support the theory that midterms are low variance
baseline elections that contrast with the higher variance presidential election. The standard
deviation of Justicialist party vote was 7.2 percent during a presidential election, but only 3.6
percent during a midterm election. The prominent role of the president in Argentina also may
intensify surge and decline. Argentine presidents wield significantly more power, relative to the
legislature, than in the United States.161 In Cataife’s model of vote choice in Argentina, he stated,
“In general, midterm elections in Argentina are unimportant.”162 While I’d disagree with his
negative perspective on midterms, the importance and power of the presidency in Argentina
corroborates the idea that presidential elections are high stimulus environments that benefit the
president’s party, but midterm elections are low-variance elections with consistent vote shares.
This can also be seen in a more qualitative case-by-case lens through a few Argentine
elections. For instance, in 2011 Cristina Kirchner’s Justicialist party won over half the vote,
securing 60 percent of the seats, a larger majority than any party in Argentina’s history.
However, this success failed to strike twice, and her party only won around 60 percent of their
most recent vote. The inverse case is particularly useful when considering the 2017 midterm, the
only midterm in Argentina’s democratic history where the sitting party gained seats. The election
was famous for the impressive upset victory of Mauricio Macri and his Cambiemos party.
However, the party itself failed to achieve significant success, winning only 36 percent of the
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assembly’s seats. This underperformance means an improvement in the midterm was easier, and
despite relatively high inflation and low GNI growth, Macri’s party was able to improve on their
2015 performance.
4.3.4 Presidential Penalty
Employing Erikson’s methodology for testing presidential penalty in Argentina shows no
strong evidence for a consistent presidential penalty (Figure 9). Midterm elections aren’t
correlated with their previous presidential counterparts (in fact there was a slight, insignificant,
negative correlation). Furthermore, there is significant variation in midterm decline and little

Figure 9: Presidential Party Performance in Concurrent and Non-Concurrent Elections
The electoral results of presidential parties in the election before and after a midterm don’t
match Erikson’s presidential penalty scenario. Vote percentage during and after a presidential
election aren’t positively correlated.
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evidence that presidents are being punished a consistent amount. This doesn’t mean presidential
parties don’t face inherent penalties during midterms, but rather that the scale of the presidential
penalty is more limited in comparison to the scale of normal variation in midterms.
4.3.5 Argentina and its Midterms
Despite Argentina’s smaller sample size of democratic elections, a clear midterm effect
emerges. Presidential parties are consistently punished during midterm elections and tend to lose
a notable share of their previous vote percentage. The strength of the referendum model looks
promising, with approval ratings highly correlated with midterm outcomes despite the economy
having less of an impact. Previous seat control is particularly telling in indicating midterm
decline. Higher seat control leads to more absolute seat loss, and also significantly reduces the
percentage of the vote the presidential party maintains. Erikson’s method of testing for a
presidential penalty doesn’t reinforce the idea that there is a standard punishment that
presidential parties face when controlling the presidency. On the whole, the model was able to
predict a significant amount of the variance in midterm outcomes, implying that election results
may be more dictated by these fundamentals than other short-term factors.
5. El Salvador
Beginning around the same time as Argentina’s democracy, El Salvador’s government
has a similar presidential system, set of legislative bodies, and set of political parties. The most
significant difference is the electoral schedule. Unlike in the United States and El Salvador,
presidential and legislative elections occur non-concurrently. This means no potential for surge
and decline in their midterms. It also complicates measuring a midterm election, because
comparing a midterm to the most recent election won’t necessarily be a concurrent election.
Instead, I compare midterm elections to the most recent election where the current presidential
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party didn’t control the presidency. El Salvador’s governmental and electoral system warrants its
inclusion, while the staggered election schedule offers an opportunity to observe a midterm
effect without surge and decline.
The scale of midterm decline in El Salvador is similar to that of Argentina, with
presidential parties typically losing 20 percent of their most recent non-midterm vote. My fourvariable model, which uses time elapsed since the most recent presidential election instead of
approval, explains a significant portion of the variation in midterm decline. The referendum
model fits midterm outcomes, with both unemployment and the presidential approval stand-in
model highly correlated with midterm decline. Previous seat control also predicts the proportion
of the vote retained from one election to the next. Like in Argentina, holding more seats led to a
higher number of seats lost in the subsequent election and a higher proportional vote loss. El
Salvador’s midterms don’t proceed congressional elections during a presidential race, but higher
seat control of the president’s party leads to greater vote loss in the subsequent election. Finally,
Erikson’s test for presidential penalty doesn’t match the election results in El Salvador, like it
does for the United States. El Salvador observes a consistent and strong midterm decline, and the
variance in this decline can largely be accounted for by the model.
5.1 Justification for Inclusion
El Salvador’s electoral system, government, and party landscape all suggest the country
could have a measurable midterm effect. The country’s turbulent history in the 1980s
complicates measurement of the midterm effect, but not to the extent that I discard the elections.
In 1984, during a civil war, El Salvador established what is now its current democracy. While the
government’s prohibition of the leftist FMLN party overshadowed the beginning of this
democracy, the public legitimately decided elections. Since then, El Salvador’s democracy has
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improved, and despite problems with gang violence, their elections are largely considered free
and fair. El Salvador’s president wields full control over the executive branch, serves as a
figurehead for his party, and is elected to five-year terms. El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly is
a unicameral body elected to three-year terms. This chamber serves as the litmus test for midterm
decline. The largest difference between El Salvador and the United States is the electoral
schedule. Legislative elections don’t coincide with presidential elections. This eliminates, or at
least diminishes, the possibility of a surge and decline effect. However, this allows for analysis
of the midterm effect without the presidential surge and could highlight the impact of other
explanations for midterm decline. El Salvador’s party landscape is comprised of two extremist
parties that have historically competed for control, and a handful of smaller, more moderate
parties. Given El Salvador’s encouraging case for comparison, I consider twelve legislative
elections from 1985 until 2018.
5.1.1 Electoral History and Extent of Freedom
Democracies, oligarchies, and military rule have all cooccurred in El Salvador’s history.
El Salvador declared independence from Spain in 1821, but struggled with Mexico to gain
sovereignty until 1838.163 Throughout the rest of the 1800s, the ruling class of “coffee elite”
frequently revised the constitution to bolster their own stability.164 El Salvador’s constitution
granted universal male suffrage and free elections from the late 1800s to 1931, but the elections
were devoid of political significance, as competition was limited to the coffee oligarchs who had
amassed power from the growing coffee market.165 After the election of a leftist president in
1931, a military coup overthrew the government and instituted authoritarian rule.166 Although
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this period included several elections, the military supervised them, and they were partially
competitive at best.167 However, throughout the 50s to 70s, political parties formed and a divide
between right of center pro-state parties, and leftist opposition parties emerged.168 As the
opposition parties grew and began seriously competing in elections, the government and the
corresponding political parties began repressing the left.169 El Salvador grew increasingly
polarized between state and revolutionary movements, until in the tension climaxed in 1979 and
the military overthrew the government to stop the otherwise inevitable revolution.170 In
retaliation to the coup, the revolutionary opposition parties consolidated into the Front for
National Liberation, or FMLN, and incited a decade long civil war.171
Despite the violence of the civil war, El Salvador democratized during the 1980s. In
1984, a constituent assembly of five political parties crafted a new constitution that established a
presidential system and a unicameral parliament.172 The constitution also outlined the legislative
and presidential electoral schedules that have continued to today.173 Eight candidates participated
in the ensuing presidential election, with José Napoleón Duarte of the center-left Christian
Democratic Party narrowly winning.174 Although the competitivity and success for the PDC was
a promising sign of democracy, the far left FMLN party refused to run candidates, and likely
would have been prohibited anyways.175 Their refusal to run candidates didn’t end until 1992,
when the civil war entered into a permanent cease-fire.176 Until this point, elections were largely
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contested by the Christian Democratic Party, the extremist right wing ARENA party, and the
former government party of national conciliation (PCN).177 After 1992, all leftist parties freely
competed, including the FMLN, who won pluralities in the legislative assembly within a decade,
and later went on to win presidential races.
The largest question in determining the extent of El Salvador’s democracy is whether to
include the elections from 1984 to 1992. This period includes the presidential elections of 1984
and 1989, and the legislative elections of 1985, 1988, and 1991. Adding these elections allows
for a larger sample size and adds an additional change in presidential power between one party
and another. However, if they don’t fairly represent the public, they would only add misleading,
incorrect data.
The government intimidation of the FMLN and other leftist parties created a limited
spectrum of political choice. Furthermore, voting was compulsory in El Salvador at the time,
which could have helped the governmental PCN party.178 However, the PCN never won the
presidency or a plurality of the legislative assembly, and the fine for not voting was rarely, if
ever, evoked.179 While the limit of a political spectrum certainly is problematic, El Salvador’s
remaining parties competed enthusiastically and the electoral structures limited corruption and
fraud. No single party maintained control of either the legislative assembly or the presidency for
the eight years from 1984 to 1992.180 In the 1984 presidential elections, the far-right ARENA
party and the left-leaning PDC party fought violently in the newspapers to degrade each other,
and generally showed no signs of collusion.181 This suggests that while the government excluded
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the FMLN, the changes in support of the remaining three parties represent changes in the will of
the people. Furthermore, El Salvador’s election commission went to great lengths to ensure
access to the ballot box without opening doors for double voting and other fraudulent
behavior.182 Chitnes suggests the administration of the electoral process went well considering
the difficulties of hosting elections during a civil war.183 Even with one fewer political party,
gains and losses in the party controlling the presidency still occur, they just help other opposition
parties rather than the FMLN. Because of the nature of my analysis, the inter-party competition
between the PCN, PDC, and ARENA parties, and the respectable nature of El Salvador’s
electoral processes, I begin my analysis with the presidential election of 1984, and the midterm
election of 1985.
Though I include elections throughout the 1980s, I must consider the extent to which El
Salvador’s elections were free and fair since then. Since the 1992 peace processes, the ARENA
and FMLN have become the two largest parties, alternating control of the legislature and
presidency.184 Since Freedom House began measuring global political freedom, El Salvador has
been considered free.185 Freedom house states that El Salvador’s elections are “generally credible
and free”.186 The most significant problem to El Salvador’s democracy is criminal gang activity.
Gang violence is commonplace in El Salvador, and occasionally escalates to threats and violence
towards those in government.187 While certainly problematic for the public’s freedom from war
and violence, the gang violence remains mostly isolated from El Salvador’s electoral processes.
Freedom house considers El Salvador’s electoral system close to perfect, receiving a score of
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11/12.188 Although the 2014 presidential election was labeled as fraudulent by losing parties, and
there were allegations of vote buying by the opposing ARENA party, international observers
considered the elections credible.189 Furthermore, the political pluralism in El Salvador is
encouraging, receiving a score of 14/16, with several parties competing outside the influence of
the military or foreign powers.190 However, once again, the impact of gang related problems is
worrying. Political parties often ask permission from gangs to operate in areas, and have
reportedly asked gangs to deliver votes of citizens living within the gang’s grasp.191 While
certainly serious problems, the scale has remained minimal, and electoral frameworks have
prevented outside influences from impacting who votes for what party.192 While potentially not
as democratically strong as Argentina, El Salvador’s elections are free and credible.
5.1.2 Government and Electoral System in El Salvador
El Salvador is a presidential system. The president leads the country’s military, oversees
and steers foreign relations, and works with the assembly to pass legislation. Although the
president has less veto power than Argentina and cannot propose laws directly to the legislature
like in Argentina, they have significant power through the Council of Ministers. The president
chooses the Council of Ministers, who oversee parts of the government, propose laws to the
assembly, and help create the annual budget. The party leader has largely been the presidential
nominee, with most parties’ presidential nominees rising from the party establishment.193 For the
FMLN, most of the presidential candidates were either avid party members or former leaders of
the associated guerilla movement.194 The ARENA presidential candidates have been leaders
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within the legislative assembly for the most part, and therefore have strong ties to the party.195
The nationalized nature of politics in El Salvador also suggests the president represents their
party. Jones and Mainwaring note that El Salvador’s politics are particularly nationalized, with
the issues relevant on a national scale identical to the prominent issues on a local scale.196 This
means political issues are dictated by those at the top of the party, in this case, the presidential
candidate.197 Because of the prominent role of the president and their ties to the party, El
Salvador’s presidents are seen as the leader of both the government and their party.
The president and vice president serve five-year terms but are prohibited from seeking
two consecutive terms. The presidential race has no electoral college, so the president must win a
majority of the popular vote to move on. This creates two rounds of elections. If, in the first
round, a candidate receives over fifty percent of the vote, they are elected. Otherwise, there is a
runoff a month later between the top two candidates. For measurement, I use the first election
round in measuring the president’s electoral success. This allows comparison of all elections, and
prevents presidents going through a runoff from benefitting from a race with fewer competitors.
5.1.3 The Legislative Branch
Legislative power in El Salvador is held by a legislative assembly of eighty-four
members.198 Unlike Argentina and the United States, there is only one branch. The assembly
mirrors the role of the legislature in the United States, and has the power to decree taxes, ratify
treaties, help create the annual budget with the Minister of the Treasury, and pass laws.199 In
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comparison to Argentina, the legislature wields slightly more power relative to the president.
When measuring the midterm effect, I focus on this legislative assembly and the presidential
party’s vote share within it.
The legislative branch provides slight electoral complications. The parliament serves
three-year terms and is elected in multi-member constituencies according to the proportional
representation Hare quota.200 The Hare method operates differently from the D’Hondt method,
favoring small parties and incentivizing parties to split into smaller sub-parties because of
electoral benefit. Fortunately, since each voter only votes for one party, I can use the raw vote
totals as the measurement of midterm success, rather than seat allocation. During 1991 electoral
revisions, the size of the legislature increased, and about a fourth of the seats were reserved for
national representatives elected nationally by proportional representation.201 This could slightly
interfere with comparisons between elections before and after the revision. Voters might change
their vote knowing that the vote will favor the party on both the district and national level.
However, this effect is likely to be small because voters for a party generally want those party
members elected as district representatives, and also as national representatives. Given the
minimal effect and that this only interferes with one election, I ignore the electoral revision.
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5.1.4 Political Parties
The largest El Salvadorian party is the Nationalist Republican Alliance, or ARENA. They
are an extremist right-wing party, and serve as the primary competitors with the leftist FMLN
party.202 They controlled the presidency from 1989 to 2009, and have largely maintained either
majorities or pluralities within the National Assembly.203 With the growth of the FMLN, the
ARENA party has formed coalitions with the PCN party to maintain control of the legislature.204
Still, their historic and current success suggests I should use them as the measurement party for
understanding the extent of the midterm effect. The ARENA party has won four presidential
elections in 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004.
The main opposition party is the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, or FMLN.
They were barred from elections in the first several years in El Salvador but have since become
the main competitor with ARENA.205 The leftist party has historically been comprised of several
smaller parties ranging from communist to more moderate left-of-center parties. Because of this
coalition characteristic, there were frequent party divisions in the late 80s and early 90s
concerning how far to the left the party should be.206 While small divisions still happen, the
FMLN has since consolidated and performed better, controlling the presidency from 2009 to
2019.207 Although the FMLN has maintained the plurality of seats on several occasions, the
ARENA party forms coalitions with the PDC and PCN parties to prevent FMLN control. The
exception was in 2011 when a faction of the ARENA party split off and formed their own party
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(GANA), aiding the FMLN in control of the legislature until the 2012 elections.208 The FMLN
has won the presidency in 2009 and 2014.
The next two largest parties historically are the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and
the National Conciliation Party (PCN). These have existed since electoral reforms in 1984, and
have occupied the center of El Salvador’s political spectrum.209 The PDC lies to the left of the
PCN, and more frequently works with the FMLN in the legislature.210 In the 1980s, the PDC was
the leftmost party, because the FMLN was barred from political participation. This helped the
PDC electorally as they were able to consolidate the left leaning vote. In the past two decades,
the PDC and PCN have lost much of the power they held in the 80s and 90s and tend to form
coalitions with each other and with the GANA party to remain relevant.211 Although the PDC
won the presidency in 1984, they have failed to be competitive in presidential races since, and
have resorted to working in tandem with the larger ARENA and FMLN parties.
El Salvador’s electoral parties have remained consistent from year to year, making it
easier to compare midterm elections to previous elections. While the PDC and PCN have
substantially hemorrhaged support, the decline was gradual and won’t interfere with
measurement. Furthermore, while there have been inner conflicts within the party, the conflicts
haven’t been so large as to discount any elections, like in the case of Argentina. El Salvador’s
relatively straightforward party landscape makes it easy to measure the impact of the midterm
effect.
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5.2 Results
El Salvadorian presidential parties face long odds during midterm elections. When
compared to the most recent non-midterm, midterms result in the presidential party winning only
80 percent of their most recent vote percentage. This midterm decline becomes more obvious
when focusing on the history of the ARENA party. The ARENA party won 82 percent of their
previous vote percentage in a midterm when comparing it to the most recent non-midterm. With
non-midterms, or midterms of the opposing party, the ARENA party won 104 percent of their
most recent midterm vote. This indicates that when comparing an election to the most recent
election of the alternative type, midterms have a substantial effect. This was echoed in the twosample t-test which showed the difference as being very significant (p = 0.000191).
Midterm election results are highly predictable with the explanatory variables, and all
variables showed a statistically significant impact. The model was able to explain almost all of
the variation in midterm success, with the model’s R-Squared value being 0.95. Furthermore, all
variables tested showed a similar compelling level of statistical significance. Previous
presidential vote, changes in GNI per capita, and previous seats held were all significant (p =
0.037, 0.023, 0.043) and operationalized in the same way as in Argentina. Finally, I tested how
the length of time since the most recent presidential election would impact the midterm success
of the president’s party. Although the p value was just over 0.05, there was an inverse
relationship between the years since the most recent presidential election occurred and the
presidential party’s performance in the midterm. El Salvador’s elections were largely predictable
using these four variables, with all of the variables significantly determining midterm success.
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Table 8: Explaining Seat Proportion Retained by President’s Party (Unemployment %): El
Salvador
Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Standard Error

tStat

P-value

Intercept

55.5301

36.6944

1.513

0.1906

Time Elapsed (Years)

- 4.0301

1.5841

- 2.544

0.0516 .

Unemployment (%)

1.8939

0.5920

3.199

0.0240 *

Previous Presidential
Vote (%)

1.5536

0.5599

2.775

0.0391 *

Previous Seat Control

- 0.8511

0.3119

- 2.729

0.0413 *

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Multiple R-squared: 0.9506, Adjusted R-squared: 0.911
N: 10, Residual standard error: 5.175 on 5 degrees of freedom

Table 9: Explaining Seat Proportion Retained by President’s Party (Presidential Approval
Proxy): El Salvador
Explanatory Variables

Coefficients

Standard Error

tStat

P-value

Intercept

- 36.379

32.956

- 1.104

0.30615

Time Elapsed (Years)

- 6.872

2.060

- 3.335

0.00246 *

4.609

0.01250 **

Previous Presidential
2.839
0.616
Vote (%)
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Multiple R-squared: 0.8369, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7903
N: 10, Residual standard error: 7.944 on 7 degrees of freedom

Table 10: Midterm Performance vs. Non-Midterm Performance: El Salvador
Midterm Status

Mean Proportion of
Previous Vote Percentage

Standard
Deviation

Mean Proportion of
Previous Seats

Standard
Deviation

Midterm

82.5

7.45

79.1

8.50

Non-Midterm

104.0

3.02

130.0

27.9
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Figure 10: Midterms and Non-Midterms in El Salvador
As can be seen in the box plot, elections go worse for the ARENA party when controlling the
presidency. The majority of midterm elections result in a vote loss of around ten to twentyfive percent
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Figure 11: Midterm Performance (1991-2018)
In midterm elections, presidential parties tend to worsen their vote performance. Both the
FMLN party (red with vertical stripes), and the ARENA Party (blue with horizontal stripes)
suffer when controlling the presidency.
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Figure 12: ARENA Party Vote Change (Midterms Highlighted)
By looking at the electoral history of the ARENA party, it becomes clear that midterms (red
vertical lines) result in vote losses more consistently than non-midterms (blue horizontal
lines).
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5.3 The Analysis
5.3.1 The Effect
Parties are penalized during midterms when controlling the presidency. On first glance, it
may not seem that midterms go particularly bad for the party controlling the presidency. For
instance, in 2006, the ARENA party improved on their 2003 performance by 20 percent, while in
both 2000 and 2015, the presidential party maintained their vote percentage and even improved
slightly. However, these instances were improvements on previous midterms, not improvements
from a time when a different party controlled the presidency. When comparing midterms to nonmidterms, and non-midterms to midterms, there hasn’t been a single midterm election that has
resulted in a higher vote percentage than the most recent non-midterm. Furthermore, this
midterm decline is significant, with the presidential party typically only winning around eighty
percent of their vote when they didn’t control the presidency.
There’s an important caveat to the findings. While comparing midterms to non-midterms
and vice-versa allows for greater analysis of the differences between the two, the lack of transfer
of power in El Salvador means that there are limited comparison points. When analyzing
ARENA’s electoral history, I consider eleven elections. While this is already a small sample
size, to compare midterms to non-midterms and vice-versa, I compare these eleven elections to
only three different elections. 1991 is being compared to 1988, when the PDC controlled the
presidency, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 are being compared to 1994, a concurrent
legislative and presidential election, and 2012, 2015, 2018 are being compared to 2009, before
presidential control switched from ARENA to FMLN (See Figure 13).
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Figure 13: El Salvador Election Timeline
El Salvador’s election schedule and dearth of presidential party switches limits the number of elections used for comparison.
Arrows point to the election that is being compared to. For instance, the 1991 election is being compared to the 1988 election.
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It’s possible that these three elections were anomalously impressive for the party that
went on to control the presidency, making it easier for there to be midterm decline in the future.
Still, given that none of the midterms matched the performance of the most recent non-midterm,
it’s likely the consistently poor performance can’t be traced to bad luck. Still, with a new party
winning the presidency in 2019, (GANA), it will be valuable to see how their party fares when
controlling the presidency, adding another switch of power.
5.3.2 Referendum Model
Despite El Salvador’s lack of consistently measured presidential approval ratings, the
determinants of midterm success imply a relationship between governmental performance and
how the president’s party is treated during midterms. The first aspect of this is the economy.
When measured by changes in per capita gross national income, the economy showed a notable
connection to midterm success, with higher changes in GNI per capita correlated with better
midterm performance. It’s important to note that other economic variables, such as inflation and
unemployment, didn’t show the same level of correlation. Still, there was a significant
relationship between changes in per capital GNI even with modifications to the set of
independent variables. For instance, when removing one of the three other variables, the
significance of GNI changes improved (p < 0.01).
Although approval rating wasn’t tracked throughout El Salvador’s democratic history,
and isn’t involved in the model, it’s possible that presidential performance in the most recent
election could serve as a stand-in for the variable. Obviously, there isn’t a one to one
relationship, because presidential approval tends to decline after the presidential election.
However, election margins of a presidential election offered a valuable, if flawed, heuristic of the
president’s approval. Given this assumption, the positive relationship between a president’s vote
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at election day and their party’s performance in future midterm elections suggests that more
popular presidents will be rewarded with larger legislative backing.
This possibility is strengthened by the relationship between the elapsed time from a
presidential election and midterm results. As the president’s tenure increases, their party tends to
suffer in legislative elections. This is consistent with the general decline of presidential approval
throughout a president’s term. In the United States and beyond, presidential approval tends to
begin high in an initial honeymoon period, and then decline throughout the president’s term,
barring any notable events or actions. The correlation between time elapsed since a presidential
election and midterm success reinforces the idea that the president’s popularity impacts
midterms.
If this were true, one would expect time elapsed and presidential vote combined to be
highly correlated with midterm results. Because presidential vote may serve as a proxy for initial
approval ratings, and the time elapsed serves as a stand-in for potential declines, the two
variables together should predict midterm elections fairly well. Although removing changes in
GNI per capita and previous seats limits the amount of variance explained, the model still serves
as a solid predicter. This model (Table 9) has an R2 value of 0.84 – not far from the 0.94 of the
full model – and both presidential performance and time elapsed have a significant relationship
with midterm success (p = 0.0025 and p = 0.013, respectively). This combination of variables
serves as a better indicator than any other combination of two variables, and also suggests that
presidential approval could be related to future success of the president’s party. This connection
combined with the significance of GNI per capita in predicting midterm success suggests that the
referendum model holds particularly true in El Salvador.
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Although approval ratings weren’t measured consistently enough through El Salvador’s
entire political history, they were tracked in the leadup to the 2018 midterms. Four years into his
presidential term, Sánchez Cerén had an approval rating of only 27%, with 71% of Salvadorians
disapproving of his performance.212 This also marks the lowest recorded approval of any president
in the last thirty years.213 A few weeks later, Cerén’s FMLN party went on to win less than 60
percent of their vote percentage from the most recent non-midterm election, the largest midterm
loss in El Salvador’s history. The lowest approval leading to the most significant midterm loss
strengthens the idea that presidential approval matters in El Salvador’s midterm. Post-election
analysis focused on how the midterm loss represented the public’s response to Cerén’s poor
handling of crime and inability to invigorate the economy.214 The low approval rating value also
provides face validity to my method of approximating approval rating using presidential approval
and the time elapsed since inauguration. Cerén won only 48.9 percent of the vote during his
presidential run, the second lowest of any president in El Salvador’s history, and there had been
four years that had elapsed since his inauguration, a combination of variables that indicate a low
approval rating. Although this is only one data point, it validates the idea of a referendum model
and supports my method for approximating approval ratings.
5.3.3 Mean Reversion and Surge and Decline
Although El Salvador doesn’t have a consistent surge and decline effect, the country isn’t
shielded from the statistical rule of mean reversion. The number of seats a party controls has an
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inverse correlation with their midterm performance. This shouldn’t be surprising. As a party
controls more seats, it means they performed better in the most recent election, and therefore it’s
more difficult to perform highly in comparison to that.
The existence of a midterm penalty in El Salvador despite the lack of concurrent
legislative and presidential elections suggests that midterm loss goes beyond just surge and
decline, at least in El Salvador. There’s been times in El Salvador’s history that there have been a
presidential and legislative election in the same year: 1994, and 2009. In 1994 these elections
occurred at the same time, but in 2009 they occurred several months apart, meaning the
legislative election wasn’t concurrent. When Armando Calderón Sol won the presidency in 1994,
his party also won 45 percent of the vote, the second highest vote percentage obtained by his
party before or since.215 In the following years that his ARENA party controlled the presidency,
the average proportion of previous vote received was 80.5%. Although this is certainly a decline,
it’s not notably worse than the average midterm decline (80.6%), or worse than elections that
followed a midterm of the other party, rather than a presidential race (80.7%). Although the
sample sizes are extremely small, midterm decline in El Salvador isn’t caused exclusively by a
surge and decline following the 1994 presidential elections.
While this doesn’t serve as evidence against the presence of surge and decline, it shows
that midterm decline can occur even in electoral systems with nonconcurrent elections. Although
surge and decline may strengthen the amplitude of midterm decline, there are other factors, at
least in El Salvador, that create midterm decline.
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Figure 14: Presidential Party Performance in Concurrent and Non-Concurrent
Elections The electoral results of presidential parties in the election before and after a
midterm don’t match Erikson’s presidential penalty scenario. Vote percentage during and
after a presidential election aren’t significantly positively correlated and midterm vote
variance is large.
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5.3.4 Presidential Penalty
It’s difficult to show that presidential penalty impacts elections in El Salvador. It’s
possible to apply Erikson’s strategy of testing for a possible presidential penalty by plotting the
relationship between the congressional vote before and after a midterm. His model would
suggest that the vote percentages are highly correlated, but the midterm performance of a party is
a consistent amount worse because of this presidential penalty. Although midterms are worse
than the previous non-midterm election (i.e. midterm decline exists), the drop in performance
isn’t consistent, and there’s little correlation between previous election vote percentage and
midterm vote percentage. While it’s impossible to reject Erikson’s claim of a presidential
penalty, it isn’t obvious that it takes place in El Salvador.
5.3.5 El Salvador and its Midterms
El Salvador’s midterms are both extremely consistent and highly predicted by
unemployment, time elapsed since the most recent presidential election, previous seat control,
and previous presidential performance. The referendum model particularly fits elections El
Salvador. Unlike Argentina and the United States, the economy, measured by unemployment,
has a statistically significant relationship with midterm decline. Furthermore, the presidential
approval model, which uses presidential performance and time elapsed since the most recent
election as a proxy for poll-based-approval, correlates closely with midterm outcomes. The
existence of a strong midterm effect despite the lack of a surge and decline in El Salvador
suggests that surge and decline isn’t a prerequisite for midterm effects. Still, previous seat
control did have a significant impact on the vote percentage retained. Finally, Erikson’s test of
presidential penalty didn’t show the existence of presidential penalty.
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6. Discussion
6.1 The Referendum Model
The referendum model most closely explains variance in midterm. In all three countries,
the economy and approval ratings indicate a closer relationship with midterms than seat control
or presidential success. While the existence of a referendum model has long been documented in
the United States, voters in Latin America also use elections to respond to the president’s
handling of government. Domínguez states that Latin American voters tend to support the
president’s party when economic conditions are good during his presidency and punish him
when they are bad.216
Although both the economy and approval ratings explained midterm outcomes, approval
ratings had a more significant relationship. In the countries where the economy and approval
ratings were measured (United States and Argentina), approval ratings had a more statistically
significant impact on midterm decline than the economy. Approval ratings weren’t included in
the midterm model for El Salvador. However, presidential vote percentage and the time elapsed
since the presidential election, which served as a proxy for presidential approval, were highly
explanatory of midterm success. The two variable model explained almost as much of the
variation as the full four-variable model. This suggests that even though the economy had a
significant impact on midterm results, approval may matter more to Salvadorian midterms.
It’s possible the economy influences midterms in a less direct way by impacting approval
ratings and therefore indirectly impacting midterms. This helps explain why the economy may
have less of an impact on midterm results than approval ratings. If the economy in a given year is
salient to voters, then it impacts the approval rating of the president. Although the economy that
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year might be correlated with the midterm outcome, the influenced approval rating shows that
same correlation. However, when the economy is less salient, income changes won’t impact
approval ratings or the midterm, but the correlation between midterms and the economy will still
be reduced. Because approval ratings are based on the public’s perception of what matters, they
can better track public opinion than economic indicators that may not be as visible to voters.
If the lack of correlation between the economy and midterm success was obscured by
approval ratings, one would assume that removing approval ratings from the models would allow
the economic indicators to shine. However, in all three countries, removing approval ratings led
to a less significant relationship between the economy and midterm outcomes, rather than a more
significant one (in El Salvador, this was done by removing the presidential vote and the time
elapsed). There also wasn’t a particularly significant relationship between the economy and
approval ratings, contradicting the notion that the economy is influencing elections via
presidential approval. While the relationship between economic outcomes and approval ratings
has been documented, it didn’t cloud the correlation between economic indicators and midterm
outcomes in these models.217
The lack of a clear relationship between the economy and midterm elections could also
be attributed to a difficulty in using the right indicators to measure the economy. In El Salvador
and Argentina, I tested the role of GNI, unemployment, and inflation in predicting midterms.
Although some economic indicators showed greater statistical significance than others, choices
of how the indicator is measured matters as much as the choice of the indicator itself. Decisions
on intervals of measurement and whether the absolute level should be used in lieu of a relative
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level impact the results. For instance, although two indicators could both measure
unemployment, one might measure changes in the two years leading up to the midterm while
another might measure the absolute unemployment rate the day of the election. These
methodological modifications influence the relationship between the economy and midterms.
The inconsistency of showing a relationship between the economy and midterm outcomes
highlights the difficulty of measuring the economy and suggests that the tie between the
economy and midterms isn’t particularly strong.
6.2 Surge and Decline and Mean Reversion
Surge and decline and mean reversion influence midterm results. There’s a significant
inverse relationship between the previous legislative performance going into a midterm, and the
comparative performance of the midterm. This is to be expected, given that the phenomenon of
mean reversion is a statistical phenomenon that takes place regardless of institutional differences.
For example, receiving a 94% on a test means it’s harder to improve on a subsequent test than if
one had scored an 80%. Similarly, an impressive electoral performance is harder to improve
upon than less impressive performance.
Measuring the extent of surge and decline is more difficult. In the United States and
Argentina, presidential elections allow for the opportunity of surge and decline. Presidential
elections carry the president’s party to success, a success that can’t be repeated in the lowstimulus nature of midterms. This impact of surge and decline, as measured by the significance
of seat control, is stronger in Argentina than the United States. Although higher seat control
going into the midterm election was correlated with greater seat loss, it wasn’t correlated with
higher proportional vote loss. In Argentina, higher seat totals led to not only a higher seat loss,
but also a higher proportional vote loss. Surge and decline suggests that concurrent elections are
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high stimulus elections with lots of variation, while variance between midterms is minimal. This
notion matches Argentine elections more than elections in the United States. Vote variance in
Argentina was higher during presidential elections than midterms, but the opposite trend occurs
in the United States.218 While surge and decline was coined to describe U.S. elections, it may
actually affect Argentina even more. Latin American concurrent elections have more at stake,
higher media coverage, and more partisan mobilization, whereas their midterm counterparts are
considered “unimportant.”219 This closely echoes theories of surge and decline.
El Salvador lacks concurrent presidential and congressional elections but retains a
midterm effect, suggesting surge and decline doesn’t explain the entirety of midterm loss. The
midterms elections following the joint presidential-congressional election also don’t experience a
greater midterm decline than other midterms. The 1994 presidential election’s surge and decline
doesn’t explain the significant midterm decline found in El Salvador. Even without surge and
decline, higher seat control increases proportional vote loss. But, rather than a joint presidentialcongressional election creating a surge, the surge results from when the current presidential party
didn’t hold the presidency. El Salvador demonstrates that midterm decline can happen without
presidential surge.
6.3 Presidential Penalty
Erikson’s model of presidential penalty is challenging to unsophisticated methodological
approaches. Because he suggests it’s a force that intrinsically penalizes presidential parties, one
can’t compare elections with or without presidential penalty in the way you can compare
elections with high and low approval ratings. Instead, Erikson suggests the relationship between
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congressional performance of the president’s party during a presidential race and the ensuing
midterm election can hint at a midterm effect. Because presidential penalty penalizes the
president’s party a consistent amount, he suggests there will be a high correlation between
concurrent election performance and midterm performance, with midterm performance several
percentage points lower. This explanation fits elections in the United States, with high
correlation between party performance in a midterm and in the previous election. However, this
trend doesn’t translate to Argentina and El Salvador. In both countries there is no significant
positive relationship between performance during a midterm and the most recent non-midterm,
and in Argentina, midterm performance and previous presidential performance are slightly
inversely correlated. Furthermore, there’s a wide variation in the scale of midterm decline that
contradicts the idea of a consistent presidential penalty. Instead, this wide variance in midterm
performance and lack of correlation between elections is attributed to short term effects like the
president’s approval ratings and the economy. This doesn’t mean presidential penalty doesn’t
exist, but rather the influence of presidential penalty is less relevant in comparison to other
factors. Although it’s difficult to test for a presidential penalty, Erikson’s methodology suggests
its impact is more pronounced in the United States than either El Salvador or Argentina.
6.4 The Scale of Midterm Decline: The United States vs. El Salvador and Argentina
While the power of different models varies between the United States, El Salvador, and
Argentina, voters punish parties during midterms when they control the presidency. Midterms
are significantly more likely to result in losses for the presidential party than gains, and when
gains do happen, the improvements are much smaller than typical midterm losses. However,
while all countries tested have an observable midterm effect, the frequency and scale of the
effect varies from country to country. The midterm effect in the United States is extremely

110 Gans
consistent and presidential parties lose a similar share of votes when they control the presidency
every year. However, in El Salvador and Argentina, there’s far more variance in midterms. At
times, the presidential party loses close to half of their vote, something unheard of in the United
States, while at other times, the presidential party increase their vote share by 20 percent.
However, on the whole, presidential parties perform worse during midterms in El Salvador and
Argentina than in the United States.
It’s tempting to ascribe this amplitude difference to the midterm models. One could say
that Argentina punishes governing parties more for a poor economy or that El Salvador has a
stronger presidential penalty. However, the greater variation in election to election vote
percentages isn’t confined to the transition from a non-midterm to a midterm. El Salvador and
Argentina have larger variation within all elections, even comparing between presidential
elections and between midterms. This suggests that the varying scales of seat loss are not
confined to midterms alone.
One reason may be the differing roles and expectations of the president. Although the
dictatorial leaders of Latin America have been replaced by democratically elected ones, the
legacies of authoritarian rule may have transcended to Latin American democracy.220 Presidents
wield extensive power and constitutions and courts rarely constrain their influence.221 In
Argentina, the constitution concentrates the majority of political power in the hands of the
president, making it possible for her to “dominate the legislative and judicial branches.”222 While
the presidency in El Salvador is often viewed as weaker than its Latin American counterparts, the
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president wields strong veto powers and the ability to directly amend laws.223 Other government
systems may have a legislative branch of equal or greater standing than the executive, but the
legislative branch in Latin America is mostly subservient to the executive.224 Even beyond
constitutional strength, presidents are seen as patrons of the country and responsible for the wellbeing of the country.225 So, If the public views the president as having greater control of the state
of the government, they’re inclined to view the government’s faults as the president’s and punish
her party accordingly. This may also explain the wide swings in approval ratings from below 10
percent to above 70 percent. If the government and president are interchangeable, presidents take
the full blame when things go wrong.
The long history of Latin American political instability, particularly of its country’s
leaders, may also make Argentines and Salvadorians more inclined to use midterms as a way to
send a message to a president. Latin America has historically been more exposed to overthrows
of presidents and less expectant of long-term political stability of those at the top. In El Salvador
and Argentina 54.2 and 32.2 percent, respectively, support a military coup in the case of
government corruption.226 Latin America also observes relatively high approval for those
participating in groups violently overthrowing an elected government.227 Although there’s a
distinction between using violence to overthrow a government and rejecting the president
through the ballot box, Argentina and El Salvador support firmer rebukes of the president. This
lack of expectations of presidential stability may translate into a willingness to reject the
president and his party through a midterm.
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A more significant answer may lie in differences in the political makeup of the three
countries. For one, Argentina and El Salvador’s multi-party system may lend itself to larger
midterm decline in a way the United States’ two-party system doesn’t. If one wants to switch
their vote away from the governing party, the switch requires a significant ideological jump. El
Salvador’s proportional representation system allows for parties to form easier and allows voters
to support a candidate, knowing the vote won’t go to waste. The multitude of parties and the
assurance that votes matter means voters can switch parties without having to switch to the
opposite side of the ideological spectrum. Voters can vote against the governing party, and
support a third party, knowing that their vote will have an impact.
Even beyond the number of parties, United States’ political parties play a different role
than political parties in Argentina and El Salvador. Latin American political parties tend to be
weaker, less organized, more unstable, and lack the public support of parties in the United
States.228 Rather than being ideologically consolidated, parties tend to have a catch-all ideology
that is organized around charismatic personalities to serve expansive constituencies.229 The fluid
and non-ideological nature of political parties fails to create social cleavages or clear policy
distinctions.230 This notably differs from the party system in the United States. In the United
States, the Republican and Democratic party have been well defined and separated by clear
ideological differences for decades. Furthermore, in recent years, the ideological chasm between
the parties has only widened. Detractors of the president’s handling of government may still
support his party because of their ideology and because of the ideological distance to the
opposite party. However, in Latin America, these defined cleavages aren’t as strong. Because of
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the fluidity of parties and lack of distinct cleavages, it’s easier for supporters of a president’s
party to vote against that party if they disapprove of the handling of government without
dramatically switching ideologies. Voters are more able to change party support without
meaningfully changing their ideology, which lends itself to a larger midterm effect.
Political identity in Latin America also plays a smaller role than in the United States. In
2012, over 60 percent of U.S. voters identified with a political party, while the rates in El
Salvador and Argentina were around 32 and 28 percent, respectively.231 Weak party ties and low
partisanship are a facet of Latin American politics.232 Many suggest the lack of defined party
structures results from the youth of democracy in El Salvador and Argentina. Party attachments
are cultivated over time as they are passed down from generation to generation and strengthened
throughout an individual’s life.233 The frequent interruption of electoral competition and the
constant fluidity of politics has made it difficult to forge strong political identities.234 The
formation of political identities takes time. Regardless of the causes, Latin America’s political
culture of weak partisan attachments contrasts sharply from the nationalized, polarized, and
partisan nature of politics in the United States. This difference can explain variance in the scale
of the midterm effect between the U.S. and Latin America. Although varying turnout levels play
a part, midterm decline relies on a chunk of the presidential party’s supporters switching their
votes during the midterm. Distinct political lines, and strong partisan attachments get in the way
of these switches in the United States, but not in El Salvador or Argentina.
While partisanship and polarization is less strong in Latin America, the United States
used to also be less partisan and polarized. Therefore, we’d expect midterm decline in the past
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several decades in the United States to be weaker than before, when partisanship and polarization
was less distinct. A diminishing midterm decline has been documented in recent literature on the
midterm effect. Renda shows that from 1826 to 1998, the scale of midterm decline has been
diminishing as partisanship and polarization have been increasing.235 Campbell documented a
similar diminishing midterm effect. From 1902 to 1950, the median midterm decline was around
32 seats, whereas from 1976 onwards, median midterm decline was between seven and eight
seats.236 It’s important to note that much of midterm decline is caused by variance in turnout and
electoral makeup, rather than voters changing their mind. Even if voter preferences were
completely inelastic, it’s likely a midterm decline would still arise. That said, current United
States politics prevent the large swings typical in El Salvador, Argentina, and the United States
back the early 20th century. This also means that as party attachments solidify in Latin America,
the countries may see a similar decrease in the scale of midterm decline.
Unfortunately, a diminishing midterm decline in the United States also makes it difficult
to measure the causes of midterm decline. Despite the much larger sample size of elections, the
midterm model for the United States explained a significantly lower share of the variance in
midterm outcomes, and the impact of individual variables was less significant. This too can be
blamed on the lower election-to-election variance in the United States. In the United States, the
standard deviation of midterm vote percentage in comparison to the most recent election is less
than five percent. This value was 10 percent for El Salvador, and 14 percent for Argentina.
Greater variation means that differences between midterms are more noticeable, and the role of
short-term factors is smaller in comparison. Imagine a scandal, event, or short-term change in
turnout that changes the vote by a few percentage points. In the United States, a shift of a few
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percentage can obscure the role of midterm fundamentals (approval rating, economy, previous
presidential vote, previous seat total). However, in El Salvador and Argentina, a shift of a few
percentage points is less significant in comparison to the usual midterm variance created by the
midterm fundamentals. The smaller scale of midterm decline in the United States makes it harder
to understand what accounts for differences between midterms.
The United States has long been the analytical arena for the midterm effect. Research on
the extent and causes of midterm decline have been a staple of United States election analysis.
However, as straight-ticket voting increases, the number of competitive districts declines, and
election to election vote changes diminish, the opportunity to measure and test models of
midterm decline in the United States may be fading. Fortunately, despite the long history of
midterm analysis in United States, midterm models fit the elections in El Salvador and Argentina
even better. Midterm decline is alive and well beyond the borders of the United States. The
increased variance in midterm decline abroad allows for a greater opportunity to see what
predicts the midterm success of the president’s party. This isn’t to say that measuring the
midterm effect in the United States is losing its value. However, in countries with similar
political institutions as the United States but greater elasticity of changes between elections, the
causes of midterm decline may be more apparent. And, as the small sample size of elections
increases, the results will become more compelling. There’s no reason to confine midterm
analysis to El Salvador and Argentina. Although the political institutions in the United States
particularly parallel those of El Salvador and Argentina, other countries share similar electoral
systems and are ripe for a potential midterm decline. Midterm decline and the models that
explain it aren’t confined to United States borders, and the midterm analysis shouldn’t be either.

116 Gans

Bibliography
Abramowitz, Alan I. "It's Monica, stupid: The impeachment controversy and the 1998 midterm
election." Legislative Studies Quarterly (2001): 211-226.
Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. "Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the
Limits of Democratic Accountability.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association." (2004).
Amata, Ben. "United States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997: The Official Results of the
Elections of the 1st through 105th Congress." Government Information Quarterly 2, no.
16 (1999): 195-197.
Alarcón, Benigno, Ángel Álvarez, Manuel Hidalgo, Forrest Colburn, Arturo Cruz, Andrew J.
Nathan, Ziya Öniº et al. "Latin America’s New Turbulence." Journal of Democracy 27,
no. 2 (2016).
Arie, Sophie. “Angry vote tops Argentina poll.” The Telegraph. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/argentina/1359611/Angryvote-tops-Argentina-poll.html.
Argentine Post. "Cristina’s Approval Rating Drops to 29%." The Argentine Post RSS. Accessed
March 10, 2019. http://www.argentinepost.com/2008/08/cristinas-approval-rating-dropsto-29.html.
Bafumi, Joseph, Robert S. Erikson, and Christopher Wlezien. "Balancing, generic polls and
midterm congressional elections." The Journal of Politics 72, no. 3 (2010): 705-719.
Bartels, Larry. "Elections in hard times." Public Policy Research 19, no. 1 (2012): 45-47.
BBC. “Argentina profile – Timeline. ” BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-18712378 (accessed March 3, 2019).
Benoit, Kenneth. "Which electoral formula is the most proportional? A new look with new
evidence." Political Analysis 8, no. 4 (2000): 387-388.
Blais, André, and Louis Massicotte. "Electoral systems." Comparing Democracies: Elections
and Voting in Global Perspective, Sage (1996): 40-69.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. "Table 2.1 Personal Income and Its Disposition." Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1
921=survey&1903=58.

117 Gans
Cataife, Guido. "An Integrated Model of Vote Choice in Argentina, 2009." Latin American
Politics and Society 53, no. 3 (2011): 115-140.
Campbell, Angus. "Surge and decline: A study of electoral change." Public opinion quarterly 24,
no. 3 (1960): 397-418.
Campbell, James E. "Explaining presidential losses in midterm congressional elections." The
Journal of Politics 47, no. 4 (1985): 1140-1157.
Campbell, James E. "The 2002 Midterm Election: A Typical or an Atypical Midterm?." PS:
Political Science & Politics 36, no. 2 (2003): 203-207.
Campbell, James E. "The midterm landslide of 2010: A triple wave election." In The Forum, vol.
8, no. 4. De Gruyter, 2010.
Campbell James, E. "The Presidential Pulse of Congressional Elections." (1997).
Carr, Adam. “Republic of Argentina.” Phespsos Election Archives. Accessed March 10, 2019.
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/a/argentina/.
Carr, Adam. “Republic of El Salvador.” Phespsos Election Archives. Accessed March 10, 2019.
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/e/elsalvador/.
Chavez, Lydia. "ALFONSIN'S ONE-MAN SHOW." The New York Times. December 15, 1985.
Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/15/magazine/alfonsin-sone-man-show.html.
Chitnis, Pratap C. "Observing El Salvador: the 1984 elections." Third World Quarterly 6, no. 4
(1984): 963-980.
Christian, Shirley. “Argentine Elections to Pose A Tough Test for Alfonsin.” The New York
Times. August, 24, 1987. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/24/world/argentine-elections-to-pose-a-tough-test-foralfonsin.html.
Coleman, John J. "The importance of being Republican: Forecasting party fortunes in house
midterm elections." The Journal of Politics 59, no. 2 (1997): 497-519.
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. “Republic of Argentina.” Political Database of the
Americas. Accessed March 10, 2019. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Arg/arg.html.
El Salvador Const. Chapter 2, Article 150-65.
Election Passport. "Argentina." Election Passport. Accessed April 28, 2019.
http://www.electionpassport.com/electoral-systems/argentina/.
Election Passport. "El Salvador." Election Passport. Accessed April 28, 2019.
http://www.electionpassport.com/electoral-systems/el-salvador/.

118 Gans
Elmundo.sv. "Un 71 % Desaprueba Gestión Del Presidente." Diario El Mundo. February 01,
2018. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://elmundo.sv/un-71-desaprueba-gestion-delpresidente/.
Erikson, Robert S. "Congressional elections in presidential years: Presidential coattails and
strategic voting." Legislative Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2016): 551-574.
Erikson, Robert S. "Economic conditions and the presidential vote." American Political Science
Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 567-573.
Erikson, Robert S. "Explaining midterm loss: The tandem effects of withdrawn coattails and
balancing." (2010).
Erikson, Robert S. "The puzzle of midterm loss." The Journal of Politics 50, no. 4 (1988): 10111029.
Federal Reserve Economic Data. “Inflation, consumer prices for Argentina.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FPCPITOTLZGARG.
FocusEconomics. "Argentina Inflation Rate (CPI) - FocusEconomics." FocusEconomics |
Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.focus-economics.com/country-indicator/argentina/inflation.
Folke, Olle, and James M. Snyder. "Gubernatorial midterm slumps." American Journal of
Political Science 56, no. 4 (2012): 931-948.
Freedom House. “Argentina.” Freedom in the World 2018. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/argentina.
Freedom House. “El Salvador.” Freedom in the World 2018. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/el-salvador.
Freedom House, “United States,” Freedom in the World 2018. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/united-states.
Gallup. “Presidential Job Approval Center.” Gallup. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx.
Global Security. “Argentina Dirty War - 1976-1983.” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed March 10,
2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/argentina.htm.
Hibbs Jr, Douglas A., R. Douglas Rivers, and Nicholas Vasilatos. "On the demand for economic
outcomes: Macroeconomic performance and mass political support in the United States,
Great Britain, and Germany." The Journal of Politics 44, no. 2 (1982): 426-462.

119 Gans
Hibbs, Douglas A., The 2010 Midterm Election for the US House of Representatives (September
22, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1691690 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691690
Infoplease. "Presidents' Occupations." Infoplease. Accessed March 25, 2019.
https://www.infoplease.com/history-and-government/us-presidents/presidentsoccupations.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. “ARGENTINA Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies).” InterParliamentary Union. Accessed March 10, 2019. http://archive.ipu.org/parlinee/reports/2011_B.htm.
Jacobson, Gary C. "Obama and nationalized electoral politics in the 2014 midterm." Political
Science Quarterly 130, no. 1 (2015): 1-26.
Jacobson, Gary C. "Referendum: The 2006 midterm congressional elections." Political Science
Quarterly 122, no. 1 (2007): 1-24.
Johnston, Richard, and Fred Cutler. "Popular foundations of divided government in Canada."
In annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Dalhousie University,
Halifax, Novia Scotia. 2003.
Jones, Mark P., and Scott Mainwaring. "The nationalization of parties and party systems: an
empirical measure and an application to the Americas." Party politics 9, no. 2 (2003):
139-166.
Jeffery, Charlie, and Daniel Hough. "The electoral cycle and multi-level voting in
Germany." German Politics 10, no. 2 (2001): 73-98.
Jelin, Elizabeth. "The politics of memory: the human rights movement and the construction of
democracy in Argentina." Latin American Perspectives 21, no. 2 (1994): 38-58.
Kingstone, Peter, and Deborah J. Yashar, eds. Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics.
Routledge, 2013.
Knoema. "Argentina Unemployment Rate, 1980-2017." World Data Atlas. Accessed March 10,
2019. https://knoema.com/atlas/Argentina/Unemployment-rate.
Knoema. " El Salvador - Consumer price inflation, 1960-2017." World Data Atlas. Accessed
March 10, 2019. https://knoema.com/atlas/El-Salvador/topics/Economy/Inflation-andPrices/Inflation-rate.
Knoema. " El Salvador - Unemployment rate, 1988-2017." World Data Atlas. Accessed March
10, 2019. https://knoema.com/atlas/El-Salvador/Unemployment-rate.
Krauss, Clifford. “Argentina Leader, His Nation Frayed, Abruptly Resigns.” The New York
Times. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/21/world/argentineleader-his-nation-frayed-abruptly-resigns.html?ref=topics.

120 Gans
Krauss, Clifford. “Economy's Dive Dazes Once Giddy Argentina.” The New York Times.
Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/world/economy-s-divedazes-once-giddy-argentina.html?mtrref=www.google.com.
Lama, George De. "Alfonsin Keeps Democracy Intact.” Chicago Tribune. September 03, 2018.
Accessed March 10, 2019. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1988-12-148802240340-story.html.
Lansford, Tom, ed. Political Handbook of the World 2015. Cq Press, 2015.
Lupu, Noam. "Partisanship in Latin America." The Latin American voter: Pursuing
representation and accountability in challenging contexts (2015): 226-245.
Lutz Kern, Holger, and Jens Hainmueller. "Electoral balancing, divided government and
‘midterm’loss in German elections." The Journal of Legislative Studies 12, no. 2 (2006):
127-149.
Office of the Historian. “Election Statistics, 1920 to Present.” History.House.Gov. Accessed
March 10, 2019. https://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/ElectionStatistics/.
Mebane, Walter R., and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. "Coordination and policy moderation at midterm."
American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (2002): 141-157.
Ministerio del Interior, “Elecciones Anteriores,” Mininterior.gov,
https://web.archive.org/web/20090326014259/http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/elecciones/e
stadistica/e_ant.asp (accessed March 3, 2019)
Morgenstern, Scott, and Benito Nacif, eds. Legislative politics in Latin America. Cambridge
University Press, 2002, 24.
Nash, Nathaniel C. "Argentina's President, Praised Abroad, Finds Himself in Trouble at Home."
The New York Times. June 08, 1991. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/08/world/argentina-s-president-praised-abroad-findshimself-in-trouble-at-home.html.
Nash, Nathaniel C. "Argentina's President Turns Economics into Poll Approval." The New York
Times. February 16, 1992. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/16/world/argentina-s-president-turns-economics-intopoll-approval.html.
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook: Volume 1 Central America.
Vol. 1. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2005.
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook: Volume 2 South America. Vol.
2. Oxford University Press on Demand, 2005.

121 Gans
Oppenheimer, Bruce I., James A. Stimson, and Richard W. Waterman. "Interpreting US
congressional elections: The exposure thesis." Legislative Studies Quarterly (1986): 227247.
Redacción PorTTada. "Sánchez Cerén Es El Presidente Peor Evaluado En Los últimos 30 Años."
Porttada. April 30, 2019. Accessed April 30, 2019. http://porttada.com/sanchez-ceren-esel-presidente-peor-evaluado-en-los-ultimos-30-anos.
Reif, Karlheinz, and Hermann Schmitt. "Nine second‐order national elections–a conceptual
framework for the analysis of European Election results." European Journal of Political
Research 8, no. 1 (1980): 3-44.
Renda, Lex. "The End of Midterm Decline?: Congressional Elections in Historical
Perspective." Social Science History 27, no. 2 (2003): 139-164.
Rother, Larry. “Man in the News; Peronist for the Present; Eduardo Alberto Duhalde.” The New
York Times. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/03/world/man-in-the-news-peronist-for-the-presenteduardo-alberto-duhalde.html.
Rudalevige, Andrew. "Revisiting Midterm Loss: Referendum Theory and State Data." American
Politics Research 29, no. 1 (2001): 25-46.
Sawe, Benjamin. ” What Type Of Government Does Argentina Have?” worldatlas.com.
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-type-of-government-does-argentina-have.html
(accessed March 3, 2019).
Scheve, Kenneth, and Michael Tomz. "Electoral surprise and the midterm loss in US
congressional elections." British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 3 (1999): 507-521.
Semán, Ernesto and Vommaro, Gabriel. “In Argentina’s Mid-Term Elections, Victories for
Cambiemos.” NACLA. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://nacla.org/news/2017/11/07/argentina%E2%80%99s-mid-term-elections-victoriescambiemos.
Shugart, Matthew Soberg. "The electoral cycle and institutional sources of divided presidential
government." American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (1995): 327-343.
Silver, Nate. "Approval Ratings and Re-Election Odds." The New York Times. January 28,
2011. Accessed April 28, 2019.
https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-electionodds/.
Sims, Calvin. "A Drug and Sports Scandal Swirls Near Argentine Chief." The New York Times.
October 15, 1996. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/15/world/a-drug-and-sports-scandal-swirls-nearargentine-chief.html.

122 Gans
Stauffer, Caroline. "Argentina's Macri Almost Certain to Run for Re-election: Adviser." Reuters.
September 21, 2017. Accessed March 10, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/usargentina-politics/argentinas-macri-almost-certain-to-run-for-re-election-adviseridUSKCN1BW35J.
Tufte, Edward R. "Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections." American
Political Science Review 69, no. 3 (1975): 812-826.
Tribunal Supremo Electoral. “Elecciones.“ Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Accessed March 10,
2019. https://www.tse.gob.sv/TSE/Elecciones.
Tsebelis, George, and Eduardo Alemán. "Presidential conditional agenda setting in Latin
America." World Politics 57, no. 3 (2005): 396-420.
Vanden, Harry E., and Gary Prevost. Politics of Latin America: The Power Game. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006, 212.
Wade, Christine. "El Salvador's Elections Reveal Voters' Frustration With Politics as Usual."
World Politics Review. March 13, 2018. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24345/el-salvador-s-elections-revealvoters-frustration-with-politics-as-usual.
Watts, Jonathan. "Argentina Protests: Up to Half a Million Rally against Fernández De
Kirchner." The Guardian. November 09, 2012. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/09/argentiana-protests-rally-fernandezkirchner.
WorldBank. "GNI per Capita Growth (annual %)." The World Bank. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=AR.
YCharts. "El Salvador GNI per Capita:." YCharts. Accessed March 10, 2019.
https://ycharts.com/indicators/el_salvador_gni_per_capita_constant_usd.

